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Abstract 
 
 
 
State failure represents one of the most pressing concerns for international security in 
the 21st century, and Afghanistan represents one of the most concerted efforts ever 
witnessed to address this phenomenon in a lasting and sustainable way. This thesis 
takes the position that part of the difficulty in finding a remedy for state failure relates 
to the contradictions and dilemmas inherent within the state-building enterprise itself. 
The trade-offs required by certain fundamental aspects of state-building must be 
better understood if they are to be effectively managed, and these trade-offs cannot be 
understood without critically analysing the basic assumptions of state-building. 
 
To come to grips with these assumptions in concrete terms, this paper examines the 
European Union’s involvement in Afghanistan as a case study to apply and develop 
the analytical framework of “dilemma analysis.” 
 
The first major goal of this research will be to outline the tensions within state-
building, and to assess their usefulness for explaining some of the difficulties facing 
state-builders in general terms. The second goal will be to analyse the significance of 
the specific combination of dilemmas relevant to the case of Afghanistan, in order to 
show how those dilemmas interact with each other to constrain the EU’s options for 
effective state-building. The third goal is to identify ways in which the EU and the 
international community in general can benefit from dilemma analysis when 
conducting state-building interventions in the future. 
 
 5 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
 
First of all, I owe a great debt of gratidude to the National Centre for Research on 
Europe and to its very committed staff. Although Afghanistan has been a fascinating 
country for me to study, the ongoing conflict there has also made it an especially 
challenging one. I am grateful to my supervisors, Prof. Martin Holland and Dr. 
Natalia Chaban, for helping me make sense of an extremely fluid political situation 
and for keeping me on a productive track with my research. Their guidance and 
support has meant a lot. Thank you also to Yvonne Grosch and Sarah Coleman, 
whose help with various administrative issues was invaluable this year and last. 
Finally, I thank my friends and family for their encouragement, patience, and 
proofreading. I truly appreciate your support, and hope to be able to repay the many 
kindnesses you have shown me. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
List of Abbreviations 
 
 
 
ABP ......................................................................................... Afghan Border Police 
ACP ...................................................................................... Afghan Customs Police 
AHP..................................................................................... Afghan Highway Police 
ALP ........................................................................................... Afghan Local Police 
ANA ...................................................................................... Afghan National Army 
ANAP ................................................................... Afghan National Auxiliary Police 
ANCOP ............................................................. Afghan National Civil Order Police 
ANDS ......................................................... Afghan National Development Strategy 
ANP...................................................................................... Afghan National Police 
APPP/AP3 ..................................................... Afghan Public Protection Programme 
ARTF ......................................................... Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
AUP.................................................................................. Afghan Uniformed Police 
CID .......................................................................... Criminal Investigation Division 
CIDA ................................................. Canadian International Development Agency 
CNPA ....................................................... Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan 
CSTC-A .............................. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 
CTP ..................................................................................... Counter-Terrorist Police 
DDR ............................................. Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration 
ESDP ............................................................ European Security and Defence Policy 
EUSR ......................................................... European Union Special Representative 
GPPO ......................................................................... German Police Project Office 
i-ANDS ......................................... Interim Afghan National Development Strategy 
 7 
IDLO ................................................. International Development Law Organisation 
IJO ............................................................................................ Italian Justice Office 
IPCAG.............................................. Interagency Police Coordinated Action Group 
IPCB .......................................................... International Police Coordination Board 
ISAF ............................................................ International Security Assistance Force 
ISI .................................................................................... Inter-Services Intelligence 
JCMB ...................................................... Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 
LDI/CDI .......................... Local Defence Initiative / Community Defence Initiative 
LOTFA ............................................................................ Law and Order Trust Fund 
NTM-A ......................................................... NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan 
POC ............................................................................. Project Oversight Committee 
PRT ........................................................................ Provincial Reconstruction Team 
PSC ....................................................................... Political and Security Committee 
SSR ...................................................................................... Security Sector Reform 
SWAT ......................................................................... Special Weapons and Tactics 
UNAMA ................................... United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 
1: Introduction 
 
For the last decade, state failure has been an increasing focus of attention for the 
international community. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, radical 
shifts have been made in US and NATO security policy, and fragile states have been 
placed firmly on the agenda of international politics. Calls for intervention in such 
states may be motivated by economic, humanitarian, or strategic concerns, and the 
combination of these different motives has led to the development within academic 
and political circles of an extremely diverse constituency, pushing for external actors 
to become involved with the business of transforming failing states into societies 
which will be less threatening to their populations and to the international community. 
It is still unclear exactly what can be achieved in this regard, but given how much is 
invested in trying, and given what is at stake, clarifying the logic behind state-
building interventions should be an essential part of moving forward. However it is 
defined, achieving “success” will depend partly on how expectations are managed. 
Just as local actors have limited capacity to transform their societies from within, 
there are limits to what international donors are able to do as well. Understanding 
what these limits are and why they exist should not discourage those who would wish 
to confront the challenges of state failure; instead, it should be seen as the first step 
towards establishing an effective division of labour and more realistic strategies for 
intervention. 
 
1.1 Background 
 9 
 
State failure represents one of the most pressing concerns for international security in 
the 21st century. While the international community has recognised the strategic 
importance of this issue, there are still significant challenges facing interventions 
which seek to support the structures and institutions that promote peace and stability 
in failed states. It has been argued that part of the problem relates to the contradictions 
and dilemmas inherent within the state-building enterprise itself. The trade-offs 
required by certain fundamental aspects of state-building must be better understood if 
they are to be effectively managed, and these trade-offs cannot be understood without 
critically analysing the basic assumptions of state-building. 
 
To come to grips with these assumptions in concrete terms, this paper examines the 
European Union’s involvement in Afghanistan as a case study to apply and develop 
the analytical framework of “dilemma analysis,” which Paris and Sisk presented in 
2009.1 Not only are the political, economic and social stakes tremendously high in 
Afghanistan, but there exists a window of opportunity within which the donor 
community will contribute greatly to the shape of the emerging Afghan state. The 
case study highlights the five most important conceptual contradictions within state-
building, and reveals serious deficiencies in the architecture of the international 
intervention in that country, but reassessing external involvement in light of these 
contradictions can also help the international community balance some elements of 
the state-building process which have so far been working at cross-purposes. Calls for 
greater coordination within the donor community are all too common, and it is hoped 
                                                 
1 R. Paris, and T. Sisk, eds. The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar 
Peace Operations. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
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that dilemma analysis can provide some useful principles to guide coordination and 
allow state-building to be carried out more effectively. 
 
Despite the fact that some states have made larger military and financial commitments 
to Afghanistan, the EU is involved in several aspects of the Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) agenda, without which the state-building project as a whole cannot progress. 
The pervasive effects which conflict and state failure can have on a society demand 
holistic strategies for international involvement, and thanks to the engagement of the 
EU and its Member States at many levels of the reconstruction effort, this case study 
makes it possible to appreciate the full effect of the tensions which underpin state-
building in the modern era. 
 
1.2 The Phenomenon of State Failure 
 
Many definitions and conceptualisations have been put forward to describe state 
failure, but most focus on the central government’s inability to exercise control over 
its sovereign territory, and on the failure of the state to provide various public goods 
regarded as essential for a functioning society. As a consequence, the failed state loses 
legitimacy in the eyes of its population, and may lose its ability to interact with other 
countries as a full member of the international community, instead becoming 
increasingly dependent on humanitarian and development aid, or other forms of 
external support. However, it is state capacity which most definitions emphasise as 
the critical factor. 
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A more detailed account of state failure reveals that the resilience or fragility of a 
state is actually related to three critical factors: the state’s capabilities; the political 
settlement; and popular expectations surrounding the notion of legitimacy.2 
 
The most important aspects of state capacity relate to the provision of security and the 
rule of law, but the condition of a state can also be judged on the basis of its 
performance in numerous different areas. These may include: the state’s ability to 
provide health care, transport and education to the population; the performance of the 
national economy; the degree and nature of regulation over the financial sector; and 
the extent of infrastructure and communication networks across the country.3 External 
interventions can help build institutional capacity by providing technical support, 
equipment, personnel, mentoring, or other resources. 
 
The political settlement refers to implicit or explicit agreements between power elites 
within the failed state over how power is to be distributed and wielded. In post-
conflict environments, especially where there is a written peace agreement, the 
international community may play a vital role in monitoring, or even enforcing, 
observance of the settlement. It is the vehicle for mediation between the population 
and the state, and as such, it is important to ensure that it is equitable and widely 
respected. State failure is often accompanied by internal warfare, massive 
deterioration in living standards for the bulk of the population, and increased 
parochialism on the part of power elites. In addition, mutually reinforcing cycles of 
violence and underdevelopment may create a “conflict trap,” rendering the state 
                                                 
2 OECD. “Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance,” Paris: 
OECD DAC, 2011. 
3 S. Wolff. “The Regional Dimensions of State Failure” (Review of International Studies, British 
International Studies Association, 2010), http://journals.cambridge.org.article_S0260210510000951. 
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resistant to stabilisation efforts.4 Consequently, conflicting parties may feel tempted 
to use violent means to try and renegotiate a more favourable political settlement for 
themselves. It should always be remembered that externally sponsored interventions 
inevitably create winners and losers by reshaping relations and power structures 
within the society. An intervention must be sensitive to the political settlement, but 
may also influence it by introducing new resources into the equation. In short, 
interventions are necessarily political in nature. 
 
Finally, legitimacy is derived from popular expectations about what the terms of state-
society relations should be. Healthy state-society relations depend on the ability of the 
population to articulate its collective demands on the state, and on the state’s ability 
and willingness to respond. However, social structures in a failed state environment 
do not always allow groups to aggregate and articulate their interests through peaceful 
political processes, and legitimacy may be a highly contested notion, deriving from 
several competing sources. These can include: performance-based legitimacy 
(depending on the provision of public goods); ideologically-based legitimacy 
(deriving usually from strong nationalism or religious belief); process-based 
legitimacy (for example through the establishment of the rule of law, or a system of 
checks and balances on power); clientelism (where political support is exchanged for 
concrete benefits bestowed by those in power); and various traditional sources of 
legitimacy (such as customary communal institutions and broad social norms of trust 
and reciprocity).5 Acknowledging these sources is very important for international 
interventions, as legitimacy is what provides the basis for a state to govern its territory 
                                                 
4 R. Paris, and T. Sisk, eds. The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar 
Peace Operations. New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 3. 
5 Overseas Development Institute, “State-Building for Peace: Navigating an Arena of Contradictions” 
(Briefing Paper No. 52, 2009), http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3673.pdf. 
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through primarily non-coercive means.6 If international actors wish for a realistic exit 
strategy that will not result in the achievements of the intervention being undone, 
local actors must see the political reconstruction process as legitimate. 
 
1.2.1 The Significance of State Failure 
 
Failed states pose dangers both at home and abroad – they can produce complex 
humanitarian emergencies and wide-scale violations of human rights at the local level, 
and may also undermine regional stability and threaten international security. At the 
domestic level, the absence of effective governance structures has been linked to a 
variety of social problems, including famine,7 disease,8 extreme poverty,9 and severe 
displacement.10 At the regional level, chaotic refugee flows and ethnic violence have 
the potential to cross national borders, destabilising regional politics and straining 
inter-ethnic relations, especially where failed states have significant diasporas in 
neighbouring countries.11 And at the international level, failed states are often linked 
to drug smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, and organised 
crime.12 Given the condition of government institutions within failed states, it falls to 
the international community to address the situation. 
 
                                                 
6 OECD. “Do No Harm: International Support to Statebuilding.” Paris: OECD DAC, 2010. 
7 A. Sen, Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books, 1999. 
8 A. Menon-Johansson, “Good Governance and Good Health: The Role of Societal Structures in the 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Pandemic.” BMC International Health and Human Rights 5, no. 4 
(2005). http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-698X-5-4.pdf. 
9 P. Keefer and S. Knack. “Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of 
Institutional Explanation.” Economic Inquiry 35, no. 3 (1997): 590-602. 
10 R. Väyrynen, “Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Concepts and Issues.” in War, Hunger, and 
Displacement: The Origins of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, edited by E. Nafziger, F. Stewart, 
and R. Väyrynen, 43-90. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
11 L. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the 
Taliban. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, p. 148. 
12 R. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure.” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002): 85-
96. 
 14 
As a failed state, Afghanistan is of particular importance in international politics, and 
must not be allowed to descend into lawlessness and anarchy. For three decades, the 
country has struggled with nearly continuous internal violence, and has been a staging 
ground for a wide range of external conflicts within the region. Militant separatists 
from China and former Soviet republics have operated out of Afghan and Pakistani 
territory, and the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan has been partly played 
out in Afghanistan. Disagreements with Iran over water rights to the Helmand River, 
and with Pakistan over the Durand Line border have further complicated matters, and 
of course the US and Coalition forces remaining in Afghanistan continue to suffer 
casualties from a persistent insurgency. Despite the signing of a Friendly 
Neighbourhood Agreement, though, there exists no official organisation capable of 
dealing with such tensions at the regional level. The inability of the Afghan central 
government to meet successive threats to the country’s stability has pushed 
Afghanistan steadily towards state failure. The security of Afghanistan is thus an issue 
with implications for the wider international community. 
 
The situation in Afghanistan is extremely serious from a humanitarian perspective as 
well. The country was ranked number 155 in the world by the 2010 Human 
Development Index, with a life expectancy at birth of 44 years, an adult literacy rate 
of 28%, and a per capita GDP of 2008 PPP US$1,419 (compared with $46,653 in the 
United States).13 There were 2,777 civilian casualties reported in 2010, up from 1523 
in 2007,14 and the number of internally displaced persons is predicted to grow from 
                                                 
13 United Nations. UNDP, “Afghanistan: Country Profile of Human Development Indicators,” 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG.html. 
14 Afghanistan Conflict Monitor. Human Security Report Project, “Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan by 
Year, 2007-2010,” http://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-
figures/casualties/civilians. 
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320,000 in 2010 to 440,000 by 2011.15 In an appeal launched on December 5th, 2010, 
51 international and local aid agencies requested a total of $678 million to assist the 
most vulnerable parts of Afghan society through 134 separate projects.16 However, 
much of the population remains extremely poor, and access to medical care, clean 
water, and electricity is unreliable. The severity and complexity of the humanitarian 
situation make Afghanistan a pressing concern for the donor community. 
 
1.2.2 State-Building Interventions 
 
To confront the challenges posed by state failure, the international community has 
been forced to seek out new forms of crisis management which aim to do more than 
simply end violence. State-building interventions in situations of conflict or fragility 
attempt to establish the political, economic, and social structures which will regulate 
violence in the future, hopefully preventing the resumption of violent conflict once 
international forces withdraw. State-building can be defined as “an endogenous 
process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state, driven by state-
society relations.”17 As this definition highlights, state-building must address all three 
of the facets of state failure outlined above. State-building is more than simple 
capacity-building. The state’s capacity in different areas may depend on its financial 
resources or its military power, but often changes cannot be made without a 
fundamental overhaul of the basic understandings within society of how power should 
be obtained and used. This should be expected to have far-reaching consequences for 
                                                 
15 United Nations. Integrated Regional Information Network, “Afghanistan: UNHCR Worried about 
Growing Number of Conflict IDPs,” 03 November 2010, 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=90957. 
16 United Nations. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Consolidated Appeal Process 
2011,” http://ochaonline.un.org/Default.aspx?alias=ochaonline.un.org/afghanistan. 
17 OECD. “State Building in Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings.” Paris: OECD DAC, 2008. 
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the country’s political settlement, as well as for how legitimacy is conceived in 
society. 
 
As such, state-builders must be alert to ways of supporting both state and non-state 
actors in the interests of promoting effective state-society relations. This could 
involve, for example: identifying the root causes of conflict and supporting local 
conflict resolution mechanisms to address these; encouraging inclusive political 
settlements and responsive political processes within the national government; and 
prioritising support for those state functions required for effective aid distribution 
(security sector and justice sector reform, revenue and expenditure management, 
service delivery, job creation, and overall economic development). Ultimately, these 
steps are intended to strengthen the prospects for long-term peace and stability,18 but 
state-building does not always work in the interests of peace. 
 
1.3 Clarification of Terms 
 
Since the 1950s there has been a great deal of research relating either directly or 
indirectly to the topic of state failure. While much of it has come from academic 
journals, books, symposia, and research projects, significant contributions have also 
been made by government bodies and organisations seeking to find ways of 
addressing the challenges posed by fragile and failing states. This has led to the 
development of an extremely heterogeneous body of literature, some of which is 
purely descriptive or theoretical, and some of which is geared very much towards 
providing specific policy advice. The phenomenon of state failure can also have 
                                                 
18 OECD. “Principles on Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.” Paris: 
OECD DAC, 2007. 
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pervasive social effects, and the need for comprehensive and coordinated responses 
has led the field of study to become truly interdisciplinary.19 Discussion has drawn on 
insights from political science, economics, history, international relations, 
development and security studies, anthropology, and many other fields. 
 
1.3.1 State-Building and Nation-Building 
 
With such a diverse literature, it is worth clarifying what is meant by the term “state-
building,” and how it differs from other activities. Firstly, there has been a tendency 
(mainly in non-academic circles such as popular media, think-tanks, and NGOs) to 
equate state-building with nation-building. State-building focuses on the construction 
or reconstruction of a state’s institutional apparatus, typically with the assistance of 
outside powers. Nation-building, on the other hand, refers to the process of building a 
unified national identity within a population, and relating that identity to the territory 
under the state’s control. While a few authors have used the terms interchangeably, 
most recognise functioning state machinery as a prerequisite for the development of 
stable national identities linked to territory. In other words, nation-building must 
include elements of state-building, but it also requires the formation of a sense of 
identity within the population. 
 
If this process of identity formation is purely endogenous, international actors can do 
little besides strengthening the institutions which will make the state an acceptable 
base for a national identity. If an alternative view is adopted, national identities can be 
thought of, at least in part, as the deliberate products of social engineers wishing to 
                                                 
19 M. Berger, and H. Weber. “Beyond State-Building: Global Governance and the Crisis of the Nation-
State System in the 21st Century.” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 201-8. 
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build on pre-existing identities to allow different groups to live together in spite of the 
social cleavages separating them.20 In this case, external efforts at nation-building do 
seem possible, but they are undoubtedly problematic. For instance, care must be taken 
to distinguish steps towards unification from steps which simply entrench the 
dominance of certain pre-existing groups.21 Additionally, national unity cannot be 
cemented without a functioning government the population can identify with, but if 
the international community depends on the formation of a unified national identity to 
produce the stability required for such a government to function, a catch-22 situation 
emerges. Even if a unified sense of identity can be created, it may also be fragile if 
pre-existing grievances and social cleavages are revived. In any case, functioning 
state institutions are helpful when it comes to building social solidarity, but it has 
been argued that nation-building can actually be unhelpful for state-building, since 
mobilising people’s national identities may lead to calls for self-determination, 
undermining efforts to create a cohesive administrative unit.22 Because of such 
problems, it seems logical for external actors to address themselves first of all to the 
task of state-building. This work will confine itself to the terminology of state-
building, leaving aside the question of national identities. 
 
1.3.2 State-Building and Peace-Building 
 
Secondly, just as the term “nation-building” is sometimes equated with state-building, 
so too is “peace-building” often used this way within security studies literature. This 
                                                 
20 A. Smith. “Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism.” 
International Affairs 72, no. 3 (1996): 445-58, p. 447. 
21 M. Ignatieff. “State Failure and Nation-Building.” in Humanitarian Intervention, edited by J. 
Holzgrefe and R. Keohane, 299-321. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 300. 
22 M. Ottaway, and A. Lieven. “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality.” Policy Brief 12. 
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002. 
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branch of study is permeated by the idea that ending violence is not sufficient to 
resolve a conflict; instead, peace-building must go further and create the conditions 
for a sustainable, positive peace which removes the underlying structural tensions that 
gave rise to conflict in the first place.23 The emphasis on sustainability has often led 
peace-building interventions to remain in place well after formal ceasefires have been 
reached, in order to support state institutions, democratic processes, protection of 
minority rights, and long-term national reconciliation. Because of its responsibilities 
to distribute justice, arbitrate disputes, and provide security to the population, the state 
is a natural custodian for long-term peace-building. It may seem, then, that state-
building should be a sub-set of peace-building, but state-building is not necessarily 
peaceful by nature. 
 
The term “peace-building” was originally coined by Johan Galtung in 1975,24 and 
existed in academic debate for more than a decade before it came into widespread use 
following the remarks of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda 
for Peace. That report distinguished peace-building from the related activities of 
preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking as follows: 
 
“...post-conflict peacebuilding [is] action to identify and support structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy 
seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are 
required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen 
                                                 
23 S. Chesterman, M. Ignatieff, and R. Thakur. Making States Work: From State Failure to State-
Building. New York: International Peace Academy, 2004; M. Barnett, and C. Zürcher. “The 
Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood.” in The Dilemmas of 
Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, edited by R. Paris and T. 
Sisk, 23-52. London: Routledge, 2009. 
24 J. Galtung. “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding.” in Peace, 
War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research, edited by J. Galtung, 282-304. Copenhagen: Christian 
Ejlers, 1975. 
 20 
the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence 
among nations and peoples.”25 
 
Two features of this account deserve special attention, and explain why state-building 
and peace-building can sometimes work at cross-purposes: firstly, peace-building is 
envisaged as a “post-conflict” activity; and secondly, it is structural in focus. 
 
Categorising a situation as “post-conflict” can be a somewhat artificial distinction at 
the best of times. Often, supposedly post-conflict societies continue to experience 
low-intensity violence on a sporadic basis, and in the case of Afghanistan there is still 
a very active insurgency in many areas of the country. As of November, 2010, 
violence had reached an all time high, up almost 300% from 2007.26 With 
international forces battling an increasingly sophisticated insurgency, the security 
situation in Afghanistan remains extremely fragile. As mentioned earlier, state-
building alters the power balance within society, producing winners and losers. It 
therefore cannot be a frictionless process. 
 
Furthermore, since peace-building is a structurally focused activity – meaning that it 
affects the structure of social relationships, and changes the pathways of dependency 
to which people are subjected for the provision of public goods – care must be taken 
to ensure that the population actually perceives the state as the real source of public 
goods. Peace-building has the potential to undermine the credibility of the central 
state by providing public goods through other channels, as may be the case when 
                                                 
25 B. Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping.” 
edited by Department of Information: United Nations, 1992. 
26 United States Department of Defence, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in 
Afghanistan” (Report to Congress, 2010), 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf. 
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humanitarian aid is dispersed primarily by NGOs. Despite the short-term “peace 
dividends” of NGO-fuelled streams of food, medicine, or other aid, people are 
ultimately conditioned to expect less of their national government.27 In the longer 
term, state-building strategies can even perpetuate the grievances which generated 
conflict in the first place, particularly where former military commanders are 
accommodated in the interests of security and inclusiveness. Perhaps building peace 
and building a state are both desirable goals, but they are not necessarily the same 
goal. 
 
1.3.3 Security Sector Reform 
 
Simply put, SSR is the process of reconstructing a state’s security apparatus. This 
process has come to be seen as an essential ingredient in state-building because it 
confers one of the most basic elements of state capacity (the monopoly on legitimate 
use of physical force). SSR is envisaged as a holistic activity anchored in the concept 
of individual human security (as opposed to regime security).28 The objective of SSR 
is “to strengthen the ability of the sector as a whole and each of its individual parts to 
provide an accountable, equitable, effective, and rights-respecting service” to the 
population.29 
 
                                                 
27 OECD. “State Building in Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings.” Paris: OECD DAC, 2008; 
Overseas Development Institute, “State-Building for Peace: Navigating an Arena of Contradictions” 
(Briefing Paper No. 52, 2009), http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3673.pdf.. 2009; R. Batley, 
and C. McLoughlin. “Engagement with Non-State Service Providers in Fragile States: Reconciling 
State-Building and Service Delivery.” Development Policy Review 28, no. 2 (2010): 131-54. 
28 E. Gross. “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The EU’s Contribution.” Occasional Paper 78. 
Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2009. 
29 United Nations. UNDP, “Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice: A Crisis Post-Conflict 
Programmatic Approach.”  New York: UNDP, 2003, p. 5. 
 22 
The process of SSR can be broken down into political, institutional, economic, and 
societal dimensions.30 Politically, it is important to ensure democratic accountability 
within security sector institutions, and to guarantee civilian control of the armed 
forces. Problems of command and control tend to be particularly acute in situations of 
ongoing conflict where armed groups continue to show loyalty to non-state actors. 
The institutional dimension focuses on capacity-building to improve the operational 
effectiveness of the various security actors, and on the development of a professional 
culture which institutionalises international standards of conduct, including respect for 
human rights. This dimension involves the rationalisation of bureaucratic structures, 
implementation of anti-corruption measures, and technical training of employees of 
the state. The economic dimension requires SSR to be fiscally sustainable, and aims 
to develop independent, locally supported security sector actors which can function 
without continual assistance from an international donor community. Finally, the 
societal dimension focuses on improving popular trust in the state’s security 
institutions. A monitoring role is articulated for NGOs, media, and local community 
groups, each of which may play an important part in assuring the accountability and 
transparency of the security sector. While some aspects of SSR can benefit from 
external assistance (notably in terms of the institutional and economic dimensions), 
other aspects (especially the development of a democratically accountable political 
system and a sufficiently robust civil society) obviously require endogenous change. 
There are limits to how far SSR can be pushed by external action. 
 
1.4 Conceptual Framework 
 
                                                 
30 M. Sedra. “The Search for Security: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan.” The 2005 
Cadieux-Léger Lecture. Ottawa: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2005. 
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Externally sponsored state-building missions have a mixed track record of success. 
Many explanations have been offered for this state of affairs, sometimes faulting the 
design or implementation of state-building policies, sometimes attributing problems to 
cultural incompatibilities between host countries and liberal democratic ideals, and 
sometimes citing shortfalls of commitment as the decisive factor. There is usually 
some truth in any of these explanations, but to make genuine progress, it is necessary 
to critically examine the foundations of state-building. This thesis analyses the theory 
advanced by Paris and Sisk that the concept of state-building itself is plagued by 
several inherent tensions and contradictions, which manifest themselves in the form of 
policy dilemmas for local and international state-builders.31 
 
Five contradictions stand out in particular: the use of outside intervention to foster 
self-government; the necessity of international guidance for establishing local 
ownership in the political reform process; the promotion of universal values to 
address problems originating in a culturally specific context; the simultaneous need 
for social change and social continuity; and conflicts between short-term and long-
term imperatives. These are true contradictions, and cannot be removed by policy 
design. The issues exist in a relatively abstract way but manifest themselves in more 
concrete terms as policy dilemmas, which will be addressed in detail as the 
“footprint,” “duration,” “participation,” “dependency,” and “coherence” dilemmas. 
Again, it is not possible to resolve these dilemmas through the design or 
implementation of policy. Each of these dilemmas requires decisions to be made that 
will bring certain advantages while incurring certain costs. Although these trade-offs 
                                                 
31 R. Paris, and T. Sisk, eds. The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of 
Postwar Peace Operations. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
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cannot be avoided altogether, they can be better managed if state-builders understand 
what is at stake. 
 
Paris and Sisk therefore recommend a new analytical tool they call “dilemma 
analysis,” which state-builders can use alongside more traditional forms of planning.32 
This type of analysis consists of asking how state-building’s inherent contradictions 
actually manifest themselves in a given operation, and whether there are any factors 
within the local environment which might facilitate the emergence of concrete policy 
dilemmas. It is also important to ask which underlying tensions act as drivers for 
which dilemmas, and which of these are likely to take on the most importance as the 
mission proceeds. Finally, the authors include the question of how each dilemma 
relates to the others. This question of interrelatedness is especially important when it 
comes to generalising from one case to the next, and it is here that this paper seeks to 
build on the concept of dilemma analysis. Lessons learned in the case of Afghanistan, 
for example, where all five dilemmas appear, should not be transferred to a context 
like Kosovo, where short-term stability has been more or less achieved already and at 
least one dilemma does not arise. Because of the security situation in Kosovo, the EU 
is relatively free to focus on the long-term imperatives of state-building there, rather 
than being confronted by uncomfortable choices between short-term security and 
long-term legitimacy, as it has been in Afghanistan. Analysing problems with respect 
to the complete range of policy dilemmas actually observed in a country provides 
context, and is therefore preferable to explaining the difficulties which a mission faces 
by referring to individual dilemmas in isolation. 
 
                                                 
32 R. Paris, and T. Sisk. “Conclusion: Confronting the Contradictions.” in The Dilemmas of 
Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, edited by R. Paris and T. 
Sisk, 304-15. New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 311. 
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The first major goal of this thesis will be to outline the tensions within state-building, 
and to assess their usefulness for explaining some of the difficulties facing state-
builders in general terms. The second goal will be to analyse the significance of the 
specific combination of dilemmas relevant to the case of Afghanistan, in order to 
show how those dilemmas interact with each other to constrain the EU’s options for 
effective state-building. The third goal is to identify ways in which the EU and the 
international community in general can benefit from dilemma analysis when 
conducting state-building interventions in the future. 
 
1.5 Research Question and Sub-Questions 
 
To address these goals, the focus of this thesis will be on the following research 
question: How can the European Union navigate the policy dilemmas of state-
building to increase the effectiveness of its efforts to support Afghanistan’s security 
sector reform process? 
 
The following sub-questions will inform discussion on this issue: 
• What are the conceptual tensions inherent in the notion of state-building? 
• What policy dilemmas do these tensions present for the European Union in its 
attempts to support the reform of Afghanistan’s security sector? 
• What are the main challenges facing the European Union in its attempts to 
build an effective Afghan state? 
• How are these challenges related to the contradictions and policy dilemmas of 
state-building? 
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• What do these relationships reveal about effective state-building practice in 
Afghanistan? 
 
The questions proceed from an assumption that there is at least some measure of 
tension within the notion of state-building, but, as will be shown in the next two 
chapters, this is more or less definitionally self-proving. 
 
1.6 Research Design 
 
To answer these questions, the first step is to review the conceptual foundations of 
externally sponsored state-building interventions. State-building is a relatively young 
field of research, but there already exists a growing body of secondary material on the 
topic, and this will be used to contextualise the idea of dilemma analysis. The second 
step is to explore the nature of policy dilemmas in a physical setting, and to clarify 
how the different tensions interact with each other. 
 
A case study was selected as the most appropriate method for doing this because of 
the high level of detail which case studies can reveal, and because dilemma analysis is 
still a new enough idea that detailed observations are required across a wide range of 
policy areas. The archival method of data collection was also preferred, on account of 
the great flexibility which it allows in terms of selecting the subject matter to be 
studied. It has not been possible to choose precisely how the data were gathered 
because the archival method involves describing data which already existed before the 
commencement of this research,33 but by triangulating between a wide range of 
                                                 
33 S. Jackson. Research Methods: A Modular Approach. Belmont: Thomson Wadsorth, 2008. 
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government reports, policy briefs, international news sources, academic articles, and 
NGO research, it was hoped that the risk of biased coverage of the facts would be 
minimised. Since all archival research requires the researcher to base conclusions on 
the prior work of other persons or organisations, it is never possible to be sure that 
archived research includes all the data originally collected. This is particularly 
challenging in the context of Afghanistan, where ongoing developments make for a 
very fluid political situation. Nevertheless, the lack of control over how previous 
research was conducted does not detract from the actual quality of that research, and 
bias is less problematic, so long as the limitations of relying too much on any one 
source are recognised. 
 
1.6.1 Afghanistan as a Case Study 
 
For the purposes of dilemma analysis, an ideal case study would showcase as many 
relevant policy dilemmas as possible, and Afghanistan stands out as a useful example. 
The international community’s experience in Afghanistan has forced external actors 
to recognise the changing nature of armed conflict, state failure, military intervention, 
and humanitarian aid in the modern era, and should throw each of the policy 
dilemmas in question into especially stark relief because of the sheer scale and 
breadth of the international presence. Only Iraq has received a similar level of 
international commitment and attention, but the intervention in Afghanistan has the 
advantage of being originally conceived as a state-building mission. 
 
The limitations on generalising from single case studies are recognised, but at such an 
early point in the development of state-building theory it is preferable to focus on 
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individual cases rather than attempting cross-case comparisons. Prioritising the ability 
to support generalisations between cases at such an early juncture would be wrong 
because dilemma analysis involves policy dilemmas which are interrelated. The 
appropriate unit of analysis for cross-case comparisons would therefore be the entire 
constellation of dilemmas actually observed in a given context, so it is preferable to 
work towards a holistic understanding of the interplay between the five major 
contradictions producing policy dilemmas in a single environment. However, these 
contradictions are inherent in state-building, and are universal, so they should provide 
some grounds for generalisation at the level of strategic planning. 
 
1.6.2 Europe as an Emerging Geo-Strategic Actor 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, peace-building operations have replaced peace-
keeping missions as the most commonplace security activity of the international 
community. These modern peace-building missions must implement multi-faceted 
peace agreements, which regularly include provisions for overhauling the political 
and economic institutions of society and the state. Peace-building can become a 
natural component of the state-building process, and it has been argued that peace-
building interventions will inevitably be forced to broaden their mandates and assume 
the tasks of state-building.34 However, because of the pervasiveness of conflict and 
state failure, responsibilities for reconstructing various key institutions tend to be 
shared between many international actors, including regional bodies, national 
governments, the United Nations, international financial institutions, local and 
international aid agencies, and various NGOs. Rather than approaching dilemma 
                                                 
34 J. Fearon, and D. Laitin. “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States.” International Security 
28, no. 4 (2004): 5-43. 
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analysis from the point of view of the entire international community, this thesis 
prefers to focus on the involvement of a single actor in particular: the European 
Union. The primary reason for this decision is that the EU has become heavily 
involved in the area of Security Sector Reform. The role of SSR is critical to ensuring 
long-term stability,35 and state-building cannot progress without it. 
 
There is no question that the EU possesses valuable expertise in the areas of police, 
intelligence, and judicial reform, all of which are vital aspects of the SSR process, but 
there has been considerable debate over the organisation’s capacity to engage in 
politics at the international level. The purpose of this work is not to enter into a 
discussion on EU “actorness,” but the thesis does take the position that the 
organisation has become an undeniable presence in international relations. Despite 
early claims that “‘Europe’ is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem 
likely to become one,”36 the signing of the Lisbon Treaty has resulted specifically in 
the creation of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy.37 This treaty alone seems to confirm that the question should not 
be whether the EU can behave as an actor in its own right in international politics, but 
rather, what sort of actor it will prove to be. EU policy on international security issues 
such as state failure will have significant consequences in terms of the resources 
which the international community will have at its disposal, and for how those 
resources will be deployed in state-building interventions. 
 
                                                 
35 M. Toft. Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010. 
36 H. Bull, “Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies 
21, no. 2 (1982): 149-64, p. 151. 
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Security Policy, which had been established by the Treaty of Amsterdam and occupied by Javier 
Solana until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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In this context, Afghanistan will be an important proving ground for Europe as an 
emerging geo-strategic actor engaging with the problem of state failure. The 
credibility of the EU will be affected in no small way by its performance in this 
country, and due to the weight which Afghanistan carries in domestic politics within 
the United States, the EU’s involvement in this theatre will have great importance for 
transatlantic relations as well. 
 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
 
Chapter Two reviews the literature on state-building for a contextual back-drop, and 
explains the theoretical framework of dilemma analysis in greater detail. The chapter 
elaborates on five contradictions which are contained in the conceptual foundations of 
state-building, and on how they give rise to concrete policy dilemmas. 
 
Chapter Three draws on various primary source documents, official publications, 
research reports, and news articles to examine the challenges of rebuilding a 
functioning security sector in the emerging Afghan state. 
 
Chapter Four then gives an overview of the ways in which the EU has become 
involved with state-building in Afghanistan, and of the steps taken so far to meet the 
challenges raised in Chapter Three. 
 
Finally, Chapter Five assesses the usefulness of dilemma analysis for explaining the 
challenges and responses outlined in the previous two chapters, before suggesting 
ways to advance research along these lines in the future. The thesis concludes with a 
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discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of EU state-building in 
Afghanistan, as understood through the conceptual lens of dilemma analysis. 
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2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, developed countries have no longer been 
able to regard state failure as an isolated, distant phenomenon.38 Within academic and 
policymaking circles there has been a major upsurge of interest in the concept of post-
conflict peace-building to combat state failure and the problems associated with it.39 
This new interest has increasingly focused on the important role which state 
institutions must play in securing democracy and development.40 Unfortunately, state-
building did not initially receive the kind of attention which would have helped 
democratic governance, market reforms, and durable peace to take root in many host 
countries. However, peace-building practice and scholarly research on the topic have 
been developed over the last two decades, and state-building now represents a 
mainstream element of most strategic discussion about how to respond to state 
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failure.41 The international community’s track record is still not particularly 
impressive, and there have been many different approaches to finding out why. By 
tracing the development of the major debates about state-building, it becomes clear 
that the current conception of state-building has certain limitations. This chapter 
explores these limitations, identifying the foundations of dilemma analysis and 
suggesting ways in which it can be used to rethink the way in which interventions are 
managed. 
 
2.2 The Rise of State-Building 
 
Early attempts at peace-building in the 1990s usually focused on providing goods and 
public services through market channels and NGOs. Rushed democratic elections and 
quick bouts of economic privatisation were intended to set the pattern for host 
societies to follow once the international community withdrew, but such solutions 
tended to be very short-lived. Little attention was given to the tasks of strengthening 
the institutional structures which would allow host societies to cope with the stresses 
introduced by pluralistic democracy and free market economics, and the turbulent 
process of reform ultimately tended to inflame conflict rather than reduce it. In many 
cases, marketisation exacerbated social inequality, driving increased crime rates, 
which in turn led the population to sacrifice civil liberties in the name of security, and 
created temptations for direct intervention by the military.42 
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Most of the early scholarship on peace-building focused on providing detailed case 
studies of single interventions. Systematic cross-case analyses and theoretical 
discussions were rare.43 The novelty of peace-building in the early to mid-1990s did 
require scholarly discussion to define and describe such operations in detail, 
especially in relation to traditional peacekeeping activities with which the world was 
already familiar, but unfortunately this was achieved only at the cost of neglecting 
comparative and theoretical analyses. The importance of supporting state institutions 
to consolidate the gains made by economic and political reforms was thus overlooked 
for many years. 
 
By the early 2000s, the mandates for multilateral peace-building missions had started 
to become more expansive, and greater emphasis was placed on the need to stabilise 
post-conflict societies over the long term. In 2000, the influential Brahimi Report and 
various UN Security Council discussions44 drew attention to the need for exit 
strategies to be determined with reference to attainable objectives, rather than pre-
established timetables, and this position was soon adopted in a report of the Secretary-
General in 2001.45 In particular, it was realised that consolidating peace required less 
focus on speedy exit strategies, and more on the functionality of public administration 
systems which would be capable of producing sustainable social order. 
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Around the same time, new research which focused more on theoretical and cross-
case analysis of peace-building began to give rise to a second generation of 
scholarship. Some authors elected to examine peace-building interventions through 
the critical theories of neo-Marxism, cosmopolitanism, post-structuralism, and 
securitisation theory,46 while others compared various countries which had not hosted 
international interventions with those which had, focusing on the durability of peace 
in each case.47 A number of sub-fields developed in the mid-2000s, including studies 
on the roles played by spoilers,48 conflict economies,49 women and gender,50 and 
regional factors.51 Specific findings produced by these new approaches to peace-
building research were extremely diverse, reflecting the large variety of sub-fields 
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which were emerging. Across almost all these sub-fields, however, it was recognised 
that the role of the state and its institutions had been greatly underestimated. 
 
State-building now occupies an important place in most of the mainstream discourse 
on peace-building, and 2004 was a landmark year which significantly advanced the 
way in which peace-building operations were seen. Francis Fukuyama, Simon 
Chesterman, James Fearon and David Laitin, Stephen Krasner, and Roland Paris all 
critiqued earlier peace-building operations from different perspectives, but 
independently reached the same conclusion that state-building had been a vital 
missing ingredient for securing the transition from violent conflict to stable peace. 
 
Fukuyama discussed state weakness as a threat to the security of surrounding 
countries, acknowledging that external intervention could be of only limited 
assistance in building national institutions from scratch, but arguing all the same that a 
national government could eventually “wean itself from outside assistance” if it first 
received enough support to perform the most basic functions of public 
administration.52 He criticised the missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Timor Leste, Haiti, 
and Cambodia for failing to support state institutions such as the police and the 
judicial system, which he viewed as essential for the goals of peace-building. 
Fukuyama also distinguished between state strength (the ability to plan and execute 
policies, and to enforce laws) and state scope (referring to the goals and tasks which 
the state takes on), noting that the efficacy of state action is not necessarily identical 
across all areas.53 The advantage of Fukuyama’s distinction is that it allows technical 
questions about enforcement of the state’s policies to be separated from normative 
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questions about how far the state’s role in society extends. Externally sponsored state-
building operations must concentrate on how to strengthen the state’s ability to act 
effectively within the scope allowed for it by the political settlement in the host 
society, and by popular expectations about the conditions of state legitimacy. 
 
Chesterman examined the historical record of transitional administrations to address 
the question: “Is it possible to establish the conditions for legitimate and sustainable 
national governance through a period of benevolent foreign autocracy?”54 The scope 
of his work stretched from the days of League of Nations mandates through the post-
Cold War era, and into modern-day practice. Chesterman expressed serious concern at 
the implications of the exercise of international authority over the domestic affairs of 
the host state, and was the first author to explicitly discuss this underlying 
contradiction within state-building. Nevertheless, he too argued that peace-building 
had not given enough attention to the task of supporting economic and political 
institutions.55 Like Fukuyama, he criticised the Kosovo and Bosnia interventions for 
their failure to quickly establish a “functioning law enforcement and judicial system,” 
which he viewed as necessary for solidifying popular trust in the state and helping to 
create the conditions for a durable peace. 56 
 
Fearon and Laitin argued that the international community is simply too disorganised 
and under-resourced to carry out effective state-building as it is currently envisaged. 
Instead, the authors suggested re-forming state-building interventions into what they 
called “neo-trusteeship” arrangements, where certain elements of state sovereignty 
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would be shared between the international community and the government of the 
failed state.57 The idea bears some resemblance to imperialism, but the two can easily 
be distinguished. Fearon and Laitin’s neo-trusteeship would be multilateral, and 
would also involve the non-governmental sector. Importantly, the aim would be to 
prepare the beneficiary state to resume self-governance as soon as possible. The 
authors acknowledged that “exit requires a functioning state capable of providing 
order,”58 but pointed out that it is not necessarily in the best interests of the host state 
to support the withdrawal of international actors, especially in terms of the financial 
resources which an international presence provides. A functioning tax system is 
therefore an essential part of any exit strategy. According to Fearon and Laitin, 
mission creep will inevitably push simple peace-keeping missions into peace-building 
roles, and there will be “no hope of exit without a return to considerable violence” 
unless state-building is incorporated into exit strategies.59 
 
Krasner’s article went even further with its recommendations for shared sovereignty 
arrangements, advocating official foreign control over some of the domestic authority 
structures in the host country. The most controversial element of his proposal lay in 
the suggestion that such arrangements might be needed indefinitely, and that in cases 
requiring a permanent international presence, the host country should forfeit the right 
to be recognised as fully sovereign under international law.60 Although such an 
arrangement is probably politically unthinkable, at least in the view of national 
governments today, Krasner’s diagnosis of the problems with state-building shared a 
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great deal with those of the other authors already mentioned. Although he had 
different ideas about who should oversee the process, he too essentially argued that 
state-building was a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for durable peace.61 
 
In one of the most important books on state-building yet written, Roland Paris 
completely rejected the “Wilsonian” peace-building strategy of the 1990s, in which 
the turbulent processes of democratisation and economic liberalisation were rushed 
through without first establishing rules and institutions to moderate the effects of such 
drastic social transformations.62 He argued that although liberal democracies might be 
more peaceful than other types of regime, the transformation process was potentially 
very dangerous. Testing his claims against the eleven peace-building operations 
launched between 1989 and 1998, Paris found that the peace-through-liberalisation 
strategy employed in those cases had tended either to rekindle violence or to recreate 
the same conditions which historically had given rise to grievances in the first place. 
Like the other authors, he acknowledged that market liberalisation and 
democratisation are ideologies which encourage competition, and that without the 
institutions, rules and habits to regulate the destructive urges fuelled by competition, 
long-term prospects for peace were not favourable. Paris therefore urged peace-
builders to embrace state-building, and specifically to: wait until conditions are ripe 
for holding an election; design electoral systems to reward moderation and deter 
extremism; promote healthy civil society; control hate speech; adopt conflict-reducing 
economic policies; and invest in state institutions.63 
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2.3 Debates within the State-Building Literature 
 
There are a few assumptions which shape general thinking on the topic of state-
building. One of these is that state-building aims to create a modern, democratic state 
which is rule-bound and impersonal, and to foster a civil society which allows all 
citizens to have equal rights, including access to the services provided by the state. 
This kind of state has been described as an “open access order,” as distinct from a 
“closed access order” (also called “natural states”) in which the balance of power is 
decided by members of a small ruling elite, negotiating among themselves to the 
exclusion of the population at large. The ruling elite in such a society operates based 
on self-interest and a desire to maintain special rights and privileges not open to the 
general public.64 The dichotomy is obviously simplistic, but it does usefully 
emphasise that different types of state condition people to make different assumptions 
and behave in particular ways. “Natural states” place great importance on personal 
relationships and individualised trust, while procedural legitimacy and consistent 
application of the state’s rules take on greater importance in an “open access order.” 
 
Despite widespread agreement that state-building should generally favour the creation 
of an open access political order, the field is sharply divided on many issues. State 
institutions are definitely important for long-term peace, but there is no universal 
agreement on how interventions should actually be carried out so as to provide the 
right kind of support for an emerging state. A number of issues divide opinion on 
what the international community can and should do, and especially on how. This 
section presents some of the most important of these debates. It will be argued that 
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they are symptomatic of deeper conceptual problems within state-building, and that 
the resolution of such issues is not possible without addressing the terms in which the 
international community frames its objectives. 
 
2.3.1 Intervention or Reinvention? 
 
At a fundamental level, there is disagreement on whether states are even worth 
preserving in their current forms at all. Identities are fissile enough that states rarely if 
ever contain populations which think of themselves as homogeneous groups. Some 
authors have therefore argued that the dissolution of states should be permitted 
because it may allow states to re-form in ways which more “naturally” reflect pre-
existing identity groups.65 Others contend that state sovereignty is the basis for the 
current international order, and that combating state failure is essential for continued 
stability.66 This paper takes the position that state-building probably will continue to 
be an international priority, in which case it should be pursued as effectively as 
possible, so the primary focus here is on identifying and overcoming problems of 
effectiveness. Nonetheless, the importance of local identities, ethnicity, and culture 
cannot be ignored. Building state institutions where the inhabitants of a state’s 
supposed territory do not identify with each other calls into question the usefulness of 
maintaining that state’s territorial integrity. 
 
2.3.2 Identifying Failed States 
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The US-based Fund for Peace provides a useful description of failed states, 
identifying several indicators across social, economic and political lines. These states 
are characterised by: mounting demographic pressures; large-scale movement of 
refugees, creating complex humanitarian emergencies; vengeance-seeking group 
grievances; chronic and sustained human flight; uneven economic development along 
group lines; severe economic decline; criminalisation or delegitimisation of the state; 
deterioration of public services; human rights violations and arbitrary application of 
the law; a security apparatus operating outside the constraints of the legal system; the 
rise of factional parochialism among political elites; and the intervention of outside 
actors in internal affairs of the state.67 This list gives some idea of how far-reaching 
the effects of state failure may be in a conflict-ridden society, and why an 
interdisciplinary approach to studying state failure is advantageous. 
 
A review of the literature from development studies, security studies, and 
international relations reveals a general consensus that state failure is a gradual 
process, producing four basic types of state: weak, failing, failed, or collapsed.68 
These labels are intended to denote stages of decay in the capacity and legitimacy of 
the central administration. However, while various indicators have been developed for 
each of these stages, they are most useful for helping to position states along a 
spectrum, rather than for describing a series of discrete phenomena. Jenne adds the 
idea of “fragmented states” in which the central authority exercises only partial 
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control over the territory claimed,69 but in truth there is some degree of fragmentation 
in weak states of any type. Since state failure is a dynamic process, it is also important 
to assess the direction of change over time, and Schneckener notes that recovering or 
“consolidating” states can usually be distinguished from those caught in the process of 
decay based on the condition of the security sector. States that lack a functioning 
security apparatus tend to slide further toward collapse.70 At the time of writing, 
Afghanistan should be considered a failed state, but it is difficult to tell whether the 
country is really stabilising or whether it is artificially made to seem more stable by 
the international presence there. The true test will come as international forces 
transfer more control to the Afghan leadership. 
 
2.3.3 Rethinking the Normative Basis for Intervention 
 
Unfortunately, there is little debate in the literature over what kind of state is 
appropriate for a post-conflict society. However, whether the rationale for 
international involvement is to end violent conflict and alleviate humanitarian crises, 
or to address security threats and regional political concerns, or to encourage 
economic development and poverty reduction, few have questioned the basic template 
for intervention in failed states. This essentially entails socially engineering a liberal 
democratic polity which will preside over a vibrant civil society and a market-driven 
economy.71 The necessity of a foreign presence in the host country, and the 
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widespread assumption that states should resemble Western liberal market 
democracies, have exposed state-building to criticisms of cultural imperialism,72 but it 
has been pointed out that the emphasis on early exit strategies, multilateralism, and 
local ownership of reform processes clearly separate state-building from the 
exploitative governance structures of the colonial era.73 Nonetheless, it is important to 
avoid the perception, as well as the reality of imperialism. Tailoring governance 
models to the local context and encouraging local ownership of state institutions are 
two of the biggest issues facing academics and development practitioners. If the 
international community is to gain local support for its activities, it may be necessary 
to explore alternative models of statehood which can deliver basic services to the 
population, and can safeguard at least some of the values the donor community is 
eager to promote. 
 
2.3.3 Local Ownership and the Limits of Foreign Intervention 
 
Arguments that the international community should limit its state-building 
interventions have sometimes been associated with claims that state-building is an 
endogenous process, and that exogenous action cannot accomplish what it sets out to 
do.74 Calls for local ownership are common, but it is problematic to try to stimulate 
local ownership when a society seems divided and decisions need to be made 
quickly.75 Highly developed informal systems of administration have often emerged 
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in failed state environments, leaving the population with no real incentives to call for 
reform, and no real expectations of change.76 However, if arguments that state-
building must be endogenous are to be elevated above the level of just waiting for 
something to happen, there must be something the international community can do to 
encourage the process. Some authors have therefore held that state-building is 
primarily (but not exclusively) an endogenous process, and that external involvement 
should be seen as facilitating local efforts, rather than driving or directing them.77 
There has been a tendency to accept partnerships with local power elites as indicating 
an acceptable degree of local involvement,78 but the aim should be to engage with all 
sectors of society, not just elites. The development community has valuable 
experience in facilitating participation, and should take the lead when it comes to best 
practices in this area. 
 
2.3.4 Coordination and New International Institutions 
 
The international community has received a great deal of criticism for its failure to 
coordinate state-building activities satisfactorily.79 This is probably unavoidable, 
since there is no underlying harmonisation of ideals and values to condition the 
objectives of state-building. The UN Peacebuilding Commission, which was 
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established to address this issue and bring coherence to the state-building activities of 
various UN and non-UN organisations, is only an advisory body with no independent 
decision-making power. Even its recommendations require the consensus of all the 
members. Despite the Commission’s good work articulating integrated peace 
strategies for Burundi and Sierra Leone, there is reason to suspect that such progress 
will have its limits. The institution does not change the fundamentally decentralised 
nature of the international state-building community, and clarification and 
information-sharing can go only so far until objective differences of strategy between 
state-building actors will prevent agreement from being reached. 
 
In a few cases, authors have called for the establishment of new international 
institutions designed to produce such a consensus through more directive measures. In 
an article describing state-building as “an off-shoot of the development business,”80 
Sebastien Mallaby casts the United States as history’s only non-imperial superpower, 
and identifies state-building and the disbursement of foreign development aid as the 
two main strategies the US has used to project its values and protect its interests 
without having to impose American institutions on other countries. According to 
Mallaby, the anti-imperialist sentiment of the US government is inappropriate in light 
of the challenges posed by failed states. He points out that previous state-building 
efforts have not produced reliable results, and concludes that the world’s current 
institutions are not up to the tasks set for them because of resource shortfalls, lack of 
political commitment, and coordination problems. Mallaby therefore calls for a new 
international organisation modelled on the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, but dedicated to the task of developing national institutions in the 
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world’s poorest countries. By supplying money, troops, and political commitment to 
such an organisation, he says, the US could take a leading role in arranging a suitable 
international response to state failure. In theory, a similar role should also be possible 
for the European Union, or any international actor with similar values and the 
willingness and ability to commit sufficient resources to the prevention of state 
failure. The key to the success of such an institution would be its ability to make 
binding decisions to coordinate between state-building actors. 
 
2.4 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on State-Building 
 
Collaboration by researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds has made it very 
difficult to identify particular ideas about state-building and attribute them to 
particular disciplines. There is especially great diversity in the writings of 
international relations scholars. In spite of this, however, it is possible to identify 
some primary concerns and preoccupations in the literature which loosely align with 
certain fields. 
 
2.4.1 Development Studies 
 
Much of the literature on state-building has been driven by political science and 
international relations, while the development community has written comparatively 
little on the subject. Of this, the majority is fairly technical, focusing on such issues as 
the best sequencing and prioritisation of reforms, and usually avoiding the 
terminology of state-building. However, the emphasis on “good governance” within 
development circles has produced some areas of overlap. Civil service reform, 
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effective aid delivery, conflict management, democratisation, and infrastructure 
development all require robust institutions to see them through properly, so in truth, 
the tasks of mainstream development share a great deal with those of state-building. 81 
Because of the key role which state institutions must play in actually implementing 
development policy, state-building should be thought of as a sub-set of a wider 
development agenda. However, most authors prefer to focus on building state 
capacity in specific areas, without claiming expertise in how to coordinate as part of 
an overarching plan for national development. The development community has, 
however, been extremely vocal in its constant calls for greater strategic coordination. 
 
2.4.2 Peace and Security Studies 
 
Within security studies literature, one of the most dominant themes relates to the 
question of exit strategies. Barnett Rubin argues that peace-building is just a 
politically sensitive way of referring to the controversial topic of externally sponsored 
state-building missions. It is the pursuit of effective exit strategies, as well as 
sustainable peace, which turns peace-building into state-building.82 Normally the 
international community calls for both sustainable solutions to state failure and early 
withdrawal. However, since bringing about a lasting peace is nearly always a lengthy 
process, these two aims would seem to be in contradiction. 
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David Edelstein separates the problem more specifically into a “footprint dilemma” 
and a “duration dilemma.”83 The footprint dilemma consists of a choice between 
sending a large enough contingent to push through wide-scale social changes, or 
maintaining a smaller presence with a smaller chance of alienating the local 
population or being perceived as a foreign occupation force. The duration dilemma 
revolves around how quickly an international military force “wears out its welcome,” 
in relation to the speed with which indigenous security institutions can be prepared for 
the task of assuming control of the country. Edelstein finds that unilateral military 
occupations tend to face this dilemma more quickly than complex multilateral 
peacekeeping missions do, and that wherever local populations feel more strongly 
threatened by internal and external sources of insecurity, they tend to be more willing 
to accept state-building missions with broader mandates and more personnel. 
Eventually, though, even missions with a small footprint find themselves perceived as 
obstacles to self-determination. 
 
Two important lessons can be drawn from this. The first is that foreign military 
resources can help state-building efforts, but cannot provide a lasting substitute for 
endogenous political solutions. The second is that the international community’s 
preferences for sustainable solutions to state failure as well as interventions with 
narrow mandates, fewer personnel, shorter time-frames, and smaller resource 
commitments, should be understood in terms of trade-offs. 
 
2.4.3 International Relations 
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Where security studies work emphasises the need for exit strategies which will allow 
international actors to disengage so states can become their own masters again, the 
field of international relations has approached the question of exit from a very 
different perspective, asking how entry can be justified in the first place. Perhaps 
more clearly than any other body of research, international relations literature 
highlights the fact that state-building truly does require external interference in what 
has traditionally been the sovereign domain of national governments. The doctrine of 
state sovereignty which has traditionally underpinned international relations would 
seem to forbid external interventions in the domestic affairs of a state, but this 
doctrine has been noticeably eroded over the years. The Outcome Document from the 
2005 World Summit famously articulated in paragraphs 138 and 139 that state 
sovereignty should be considered a responsibility, rather than a right, and that the task 
of assisting national governments in protecting their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity should fall to the international 
community, acting through the United Nations. The UN formally supported the idea 
in resolution S/RES/1647, and later through the General Assembly’s resolution 
A/RES/63/308. The doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect,” as it has come to be 
known, has prompted critics to argue that it is unclear who decides when states can no 
longer be considered sovereign because of “manifest failure” to protect their 
populations. 
 
There has been a variety of responses, ranging from requests for developing the tools 
and practices surrounding the doctrine so that its proper use can be clarified,84 to 
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appeals for strong states to take an even greater hand in state-building interventions,85 
to calls for the international community to abstain from interventions altogether.86 
The international relations literature has spawned massive debates on when, whether, 
and for how long breaches of state sovereignty are justified. A review of the debate 
itself is beyond the scope of the current work, but it is significant to note the 
frequency and popularity of challenges to the doctrine of absolute state sovereignty. 
David Chandler suggests this trend reflects a new balance of power in the 
international sphere, and that the interventionist norms driving liberal state-building 
are just as dependent on power politics as the state sovereignty paradigm was.87 The 
“war on terror” has greatly strengthened the conceptual links between security and 
development, and state-building literature has embraced the argument that global and 
regional geopolitics require stable states. International relations frames the issue of 
intervention in failed states not as a humanitarian question, but as one of preserving 
the world order and the interests of powerful donor countries. The importance of 
balancing local interests with the needs of interested outside parties lies at the heart of 
several of the contradictions which plague state-building operations. 
 
2.5 Contradictions in State-Building 
 
Paris and Sisk offer a convincing theory which synthesises these observations to 
account for some of the most serious recurring problems that face state-builders. The 
authors’ central argument is that the concept of state-building itself contains deep-
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seated contradictions, which inevitably give rise to more concrete policy dilemmas. 
These contradictions are embedded in the assumptions which define externally 
assisted state-building. They cannot be removed or resolved, but by understanding 
them, it is possible to manage their consequences and to cultivate appropriate 
expectations about state-building.88 State-building needs rethinking at a fundamental 
level, and this paper will offer the case study of the EU’s involvement in Afghanistan 
to confirm how all five of the following contradictions present serious obstacles to 
future interventions of this kind. 
 
2.5.1 Outside Intervention to Promote Self-Government 
 
The first contradiction is that state-building missions are intended to create the 
conditions for self-government by providing foreign assistance to national authorities, 
but that external interventions inevitably intrude into domestic politics when they give 
such assistance.89 This gives rise to problems of legitimacy, and may undermine the 
credibility of state institutions if foreign control is not seen to be gradually replaced 
by local ownership. State-building is a long-term process, though. At the outset, 
foreign support seems indispensable for allowing the institutions of the state to carry 
out their functions, but eventually local enthusiasm for any foreign intervention will 
decline, and it becomes necessary to transfer more and more responsibility to local 
authorities, or risk antagonising the population and compromising the state’s 
legitimacy. Practical issues which flow from this contradiction tend to relate to exit 
strategies, and to the size, form and duration of an intervention. If the international 
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community wishes to avoid being indefinitely bogged down in a failed state, it is 
absolutely vital to have strategies in place for managing the country’s transition to 
self-government. Outside intervention is antithetical to self-government, so the limits 
of foreign intervention must be clear to both the host country and the international 
community. 
 
2.5.2 International Control to Establish Local Ownership 
 
A second and related contradiction is that state-building calls for “local ownership” of 
reform processes, but that the process of actually allocating ownership rights occurs 
under foreign oversight.90 Deciding who local owners will be necessarily creates 
winners and losers, and is a politically charged process, especially in places where the 
central state has always been used and perceived as a coercive instrument for 
parochial interests. This can have significant implications for the legitimacy and 
durability of the political settlement, which will condition future state-society 
relations. Groups or individuals not included in negotiations may find ways to 
undermine any agreement that might have been reached, and wherever such groups or 
individuals have military capabilities, they may act as spoilers. 
 
2.5.3 Universal Values as Solutions for Local Problems 
 
Thirdly, although civil wars may have international implications, they are primarily 
local conflicts, experienced within a particular socio-cultural setting. Much of the 
international assistance to societies emerging from civil conflict is conditioned by a 
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normative tradition which values respect for human rights, market-oriented 
economics, and liberal democratic institutions, but this normative basis may be at 
odds with local expectations.91 Tradition and culture can be important sources of 
legitimacy, and this paradox contributes to problems in designing interventions which 
are mutually acceptable to the donor community and the host country. 
 
2.5.4 Acknowledging History but Breaking with the Past 
 
The fourth contradiction stems from the need to remake a war-torn society to secure 
its transition to peace, without sacrificing traditions or ignoring past injustices.92 This 
requires new approaches to justice and conflict management, because the society 
clearly contained the root causes of conflict even before the outbreak of war. Since 
conflict can alter and distort traditional practices over time, returning a society to its 
pre-war conditions is not always even possible, so new processes for addressing 
grievances must be introduced. However, the international community must be careful 
not to ignore the role of traditional forms of dispute resolution, either. State-building 
places tremendous strain on society, and some degree of continuity is needed to 
bolster the legitimacy of the new political order. Continuity can sometimes provide 
reassuring stability, too, and international actors have regularly underestimated how 
resilient deeply ingrained patterns of political and economic behaviour can be. 
 
2.5.5 Short-Term Imperatives vs. Long-Term Objectives 
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Finally, international actors normally face pressure (including from their own 
populations) to behave in ways that produce visible short-term results. Demonstrable 
success is a valuable political currency, and the governments and organisations 
responsible for carrying out state-building are not immune to the need to justify their 
actions to early critics. However, some strategic decisions which produce immediately 
visible benefits may also result in long-term harm, which becomes visible only much 
later.93 A notorious example of this in the case of Afghanistan involves the 
international community’s use of proxy militias, under the command of local power 
elites, to stabilise the country immediately after the American-led invasion of 2001. If 
tacit or explicit bargains had not been made, these same power elites might have 
become spoilers, but by working with them, the international community sowed the 
seeds for several long-term problems. Allowing these men to occupy key positions in 
the central administration gave them time to expand their clientelist networks and 
consolidate their positions, both politically in Kabul, and militarily in the rural areas 
where they originally held sway. Popular confidence in the state-building enterprise as 
a whole was also shaken, because the international community was seen to be 
conferring official recognition on figures who had played morally questionable roles 
in the previous conflict. The continued power of these figures has been a significant 
barrier to constructing a depersonalised state, and broadening political representation 
beyond the parties which fought in earlier wars. 
 
2.6 Policy Dilemmas 
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The five contradictions outlined above are ultimately responsible for several concrete 
policy dilemmas, which can be interpreted as “the visible, policy-level manifestations 
of [state-building’s] underlying contradictions.”94 The term “dilemma” is apt because 
the choices available to policymakers represent truly conflicting imperatives. Like the 
contradictions which give rise to them, they defy outright resolution, but trade-off can 
be made in such a way as to balance each other out to a degree. 
 
2.6.1 Footprint Dilemmas 
 
The “footprint” of a state-building intervention represents its level of intrusiveness in 
the affairs of the host state. This is affected by several factors – most notably the size 
of the international presence on the ground, the breadth of the mission mandate, and 
the assertiveness with which external actors pursue their tasks. A heavy footprint is 
precluded when the international community wishes to allow local political, social, 
and economic life to achieve a natural state of post-conflict equilibrium on its own, 
without being subject to the distorting effects of a large (but ultimately temporary) 
international presence. Yet sometimes a heavier footprint may be needed in the 
interests of maintaining security or enforcing a peace settlement. In any case, local 
opposition to the presence of international forces tends to coalesce more quickly, the 
heavier an intervention’s footprint, and a careful balancing act is necessary if state-
building is to achieve both its short-term security-related objectives and its longer-
term transformational objectives.95 
 
2.6.2 Duration Dilemmas 
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A related dilemma concerns the length of time for which different components of an 
intervention are deployed. State-building is a long-term process, but open-ended 
international deployments are not really feasible. Not only are the resources and 
political will of the donor community limited, but longer deployments tend to produce 
growing resentment in the local population, and can lead to international forces being 
perceived as a barrier to national independence. Over time, passivity within the local 
population may also become increasingly problematic, and it can become harder and 
harder for the international community to extricate itself from support roles without 
compromising the integrity of core state institutions.96 At the most basic level, 
duration dilemmas stem from the fact that state-building is not neutral, but that it 
takes time. The passage of time inevitably reveals how an intervention influences the 
target country, and popular reactions are influenced accordingly. 
 
2.6.3 Participation Dilemmas 
 
The third dilemma arises from the political settlement, and relates to the question of 
participation in the political process. Factional leaders may not always legitimately 
represent the population of their countries, but they are frequently involved in peace 
negotiations, and will tend to occupy important positions in the political order 
immediately following conflict. Such figures often have the power to act as spoilers if 
they are excluded, but their involvement can alienate other groups and actors whose 
participation is equally important. There is a great risk that political processes may 
lose legitimacy if they are seen to be controlled by individuals who are known as 
                                                 
96 Ibid, p. 307. 
 58 
unrepresentative, corrupt, or criminal. Furthermore, popular participation in the 
political process faces a distorting effect from the presence of international forces, 
since the attention of communities can be diverted towards externally defined 
objectives, and away from those goals which might have developed organically.97 
 
2.6.4 Dependency Dilemmas 
 
The fourth dilemma revolves around the danger that a prolonged international 
presence will foster dependency among local elites and the general population.98 Post-
conflict state-building aims to help institutions become effective, legitimate, and self-
reliant, and a hands-off approach may allow institutions to develop without certain 
key ethics or competencies. However, a more hands-on approach runs the risk of 
conditioning people to depend on external support in order to sustain those ethics and 
competencies. As mentioned earlier, the longer an external intervention remains in a 
controlling position within local institutions and politics, the more resistance tends to 
coalesce, so if outside parties wish to avoid the scenario of indefinite trusteeship of an 
increasingly hostile population, they must be able to impart knowledge and training 
before time runs out. That knowledge and training must also be self-perpetuating. 
 
2.6.5 Coherence Dilemmas 
 
Finally, there are two sorts of coherence dilemma which state-builders must face: 
organisational and normative.99 Organisational coherence refers to the need for 
coordination within the donor community, and is one of the most frequently cited 
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areas where interventions could improve. It is often difficult to navigate through 
competing lines of authority between numerous financially independent actors with 
subtle differences in their agendas, and sometimes these differences are not even 
explicitly recognised. Organisational coherence is also needed within the host 
country, so that the international community can effectively engage with legitimate, 
representative leaders. As mentioned before, identifying such leaders can be 
problematic, and may present participation dilemmas. 
 
Normative coherence, on the other hand, refers to the need for action to match 
rhetoric. Such principles as the rule of law, democratic accountability, and national 
self-determination may not always be reflected in the implementation of an 
intervention, as pragmatism demands that international actors work with powerful 
local figures and tailor institutional designs to the needs of existing economic and 
political behaviour. Roland Paris warns of an additional danger of subsuming real 
disagreements about policy, decision-making hierarchy, or normative goals under the 
less contentious rubric of organisational coherence.100 It is completely 
unobjectionable to advocate for increased information-sharing and greater clarity of 
objectives, and this is certainly important, but no amount of organisational 
coordination can remove the need to tackle hard questions of resource allocation and 
value prioritisation. The international community should beware of spending too 
much time on the procedural aspects of organisational coherence at the expense of 
real debate about the normative coherence of an intervention. Both facets are 
important. 
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2.7 Key Points 
 
As highlighted above, the international community’s efforts to engineer liberal peace 
in post-conflict states suffered initially from a lack of attention to the state institutions 
that could consolidate reforms after the departure of international forces. The field of 
state-building which developed in response to this concern has been divided over 
several issues, including whether, when, and for what ends external interventions are 
justified and feasible. The purpose of this paper is not to engage in such debates, but 
to advocate a rethinking of the premises of externally assisted state-building. Paris 
and Sisk have already synthesised much of the earlier discussion within the field of 
state-building into five concrete policy dilemmas: 
1) Footprint dilemmas; 
2) Duration dilemmas; 
3) Participation dilemmas; 
4) Dependency dilemmas; and 
5) Coherence dilemmas. 
The authors argue that these policy dilemmas can be seen as stemming from five 
conceptual contradictions: 
1) The use of outside intervention to promote self-governance; 
2) External control of political processes for establishing local ownership; 
3) Incompatibilities between “universal” values and local traditions; 
4) The simultaneous need for social continuity and social change; and 
5) The conflicting imperatives of short-term and long-term goals. 
At this stage in its development, the field of state-building needs more theory-driven 
case studies to provide details on how these contradictions relate to each other and 
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impact upon operations. If the dilemma analysis proposed by Paris and Sisk is to help 
the international community, there must be a way to: 
1) Identify when such dilemmas apply; 
2) Identify the costs and benefits which the trade-offs entail; and 
3) Coordinate decision-making in such a way as to use the benefits gained 
from some trade-offs to offset the costs of others. 
This chapter has traced the development of state-building as a missing element of 
early peace-building operations, and highlighted some of the major debates within the 
field. While it is not possible to attribute specific theories or critiques of state-building 
to particular disciplines, there are important ideas which have found expression in the 
fields of development studies, peace and security studies, and international relations. 
These overarching concerns, including the need for greater coordination, locally 
owned reform processes, and justified entry and exit strategies, reflect the deeply 
contradicted nature of state-building itself. Making progress on these issues requires 
an appreciation of how those contradictions interact with each other in a physical 
setting. 
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3: Manifestations of Contradiction: The Afghan Context 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
This chapter outlines the major threats to stability facing Afghanistan today, each of 
which showcases one or more of the conceptual contradictions outlined in the 
previous chapter. As mentioned earlier, the consequences of state failure often spill 
over across national boundaries, and the following sections will cover the main 
internal factors within Afghanistan as well as the most important regional and external 
pressures. The challenges described in this chapter show how important it is to 
incorporate SSR, and police reform in particular, into international responses to state 
failure. 
 
Internal factors include the warlord problem, the Taliban insurgency, and the 
continued threat posed by terrorist organisations and other armed groups capable of 
playing spoiler roles. The illegal economy and the prevalence of corruption are also 
major causes for concern, and while an analysis of conflict economies is beyond the 
scope of this research, it is crucial to note that counter-narcotics efforts are an 
indispensable part of the state-building project. External factors include the 
tremendous influence wielded by Iran and Pakistan over the political reconstruction 
process in Afghanistan, and any attempt to address the failure of the Afghan state 
should integrate a strategy for dealing with these important regional actors as well. 
 
3.2 Warlordism 
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Throughout its history, Afghan society has always been characterised by strongly 
localised governance structures and sharp social cleavages, reinforced by the 
country’s rugged geography. In the modern era, these factors, combined with internal 
conflict and external interference, have prevented the emergence of a strong 
centralised state, and allowed local strongmen to establish themselves in positions of 
power across large areas of territory. The failure of government institutions to provide 
basic services to the population has undermined trust in the state, and created the 
political space for various warlords to fill the power vacuum left after the fall of the 
Taliban in 2001. Some of Afghanistan’s most powerful warlords control greater 
military and economic resources than those available to the central government, and 
have sought to maintain or expand their power relative to the state. Such figures pose 
a significant challenge to the political reconstruction process, but even more 
importantly, there exists a dangerous culture of impunity surrounding illegitimate use 
of military and paramilitary force in Afghanistan. If the central state is ever to become 
a credible purveyor of security and other public goods, this must be addressed. 
 
3.2.1 Defining Warlords 
 
Antonio Giustozzi defines warlords as “military leaders who emerge to play a de facto 
political role, despite their lack of full legitimacy.”101 However, labelling figures as 
“warlords” is often a controversial task because they may enjoy varying degrees of 
legitimacy with different segments of the population. Certain basic characteristics can 
still be agreed upon, though. Warlords are individuals who exert control over a 
territory where the central government’s authority is absent or contested. They depend 
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for their political power on clientelist networks and the force of arms, and often have 
a military background. Warlords are often able to access and deploy superior 
weaponry to that which is available to the bulk of the population, and they benefit 
financially from profits made through the conflict economy. Finally, warlords tend to 
apply “legitimating discourses such as religion or nationalism,” in an effort to validate 
their actions by referring to ideologies which resonate with the local population.102 
They are motivated and enabled by: a desire to capture land and resources without 
external interference; the ease of exploiting local populations; the lucrative rewards of 
the illegal economy; the prospect of exploiting international aid; and the desire to 
transform traditional economic structures into more lucrative, often illegal ones.103 
 
Warlords emerge from the power vacuum created by state failure, when the absence 
of internal security and state institutions causes local populations to fear for their 
safety. Groups initially focus on protecting themselves and their resources, but once 
they have achieved dominance over other nearby groups, strong commanders may 
begin to behave in a predatory way towards weaker groups.104 Through charismatic 
leadership and the promise of personal enrichment for their followers, such figures are 
able to entrench themselves in positions of power and control the distribution of 
resources and public services.105 However, the populations they control are unable to 
hold them accountable for their actions, and typically entertain no serious 
expectations of a change in leadership. The control which warlords exert over 
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political and economic life must therefore be considered illegitimate. By providing 
security and limited forms of other public goods through their own personal networks, 
these ultimately predatory figures attempt to attract the loyalty of their populations to 
themselves, rather than to the abstract state,106 but this gives rise to deep traditions of 
dependency on patron-client relationships and does nothing to strengthen public 
institutions in which the population can place its trust. Politics are effectively 
personalised, and even where a climate of relative peace and prosperity can be 
achieved, as seems to be the case in Ismail Khan’s Herat, for instance, there is no 
guarantee that the standard of living will last beyond the lifetime of the leader 
supposedly protecting it. Warlords are also prone to actively resisting the 
encroachment of central government institutions into their areas of influence, 
especially in cases involving the promotion of universal human rights, which demand 
equal treatment of all ethnic minorities and clash completely with the parochial value 
system on which the warlords’ own power is founded. 
 
3.2.2 The Afghan Warlords and the Culture of Impunity 
 
Most of Afghanistan’s contemporary warlords gained their military experience during 
the 1980s fighting either for or against the Soviet Union, and attracting followers by 
distinguishing themselves in battle. They emerged on the political scene by usurping 
traditional governance structures such as the village shura or jirga, and providing 
protection to specific populations with their bands of armed followers. They 
consolidated their positions by building for themselves a sort of pseudo-legitimacy 
with the populations under their control, often basing this on ethnic or tribal 
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solidarity, and in some cases on the rudimentary level of public goods which they 
took charge of dispensing. With the prolonged absence of the Afghan state in many 
areas of the countryside, the state was simply not seen to be a credible alternative 
source of security, education, health care, or other public goods. Prior to 2001, much 
of the Taliban’s popularity has actually been attributed to their success in providing 
security whilst marginalising many of the country’s warlords,107 but various NGO 
reports and academic writings make it clear that the international community’s 
attempts to disarm these figures and to extend the state’s authority into territories 
which are controlled by the warlords have not met with success. On the contrary, the 
Karzai government and its international supporters failed to learn from the Taliban in 
this respect, and opted instead to accommodate several prominent warlords in the 
political settlement at the Bonn Conference of 2001, inviting them to become part of 
the new government in Afghanistan. 
 
Aside from undermining the legitimacy of the state,108 one of the unfortunate 
consequences of this strategy was the re-emergence of violent competition over land 
and resources. Notably, the clashes in October, 2006 between two Pashtun clans in 
Herat left 32 dead and several more injured.109 Atta Mohammed Nur, a major leader 
in the Tajik-dominated organisation Jamaat-e-Islami and a powerful commander with 
significant military forces in the province of Kunduz, also has a long-standing rivalry 
with General Rashid Dostum, the leader of the Uzbek-dominated group Junbish-e 
Milli-ye Islami and a commander with similar military resources in the province of 
Balkh. Both men are officially allies of the government, but have periodically clashed 
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with each other, resulting in 70 deaths in 2003.110 In February, 2008, several dozen of 
Dostum’s fighters also broke into the home of his former ally Akbar Bai, shot a 
bodyguard, and physically beat Bai, his son, and another bodyguard. Despite 
recognising the attack as a criminal act, Attorney-General Abdul Sabit declined to 
prosecute the General because bringing him to court would have provoked his 
followers across northern Afghanistan to violence.111 After a temporary dismissal 
from his role in the army, Dostum was reinstated in 2009. 
 
In 2004, several international donors including Japan, Britain, and the European 
Commission began to pressure Karzai to deal more strictly with regional commanders 
who used their military forces for purposes not authorised by the central government. 
However, because of Karzai’s own leadership style, and because of the entrenched 
power of many of the country’s warlords, the culture of impunity surrounding these 
figures has not been addressed. During the transitional administration, Vice President 
Mohammed Qasim Fahim was one of the most powerful warlords in the country. He 
was also the effective leader of the “Northern Alliance” coalition of military 
commanders and was in charge of the Ministry of Defence, one of the most corrupt 
ministries in the government. Fahim continued to maintain ties with militia groups as 
Vice President, but under strong international pressure, he was removed from office in 
the lead-up to the presidential elections of October, 2004. Nonetheless, Karzai later 
selected him as his running mate in the elections of August, 2009. The absence of any 
coup attempt once Fahim had been dismissed convinced many observers that the 
scope for action against Afghanistan’s warlords was much greater than previously 
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imagined, but President Karzai preferred an accommodationist approach, which was 
more compatible with his own leadership skill set, and he continued to treat warlords 
like Fahim leniently. Fahim is an ethnic Tajik who gained great prestige while 
fighting the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and later the Taliban and al-Qaeda. His 
inclusion in a Pashtun-dominated government was intended to allay some concerns of 
the large Tajik minority over ethnic favouritism, but during the run-up to the 2009 
presidential elections, there were allegations that he was involved in criminal 
activities including kidnapping and ransom.112 In another controversial case, when 
fighting broke out in Herat with the forces of Ismail Khan, the self-proclaimed “Emir 
of Herat,” Karzai’s response was to offer Khan the position of Minister for Energy 
and Water in the national government in 2005. Although this move did draw him 
away from his regional power base for a time, Ismail Khan has subsequently become 
the governor of Herat and re-established himself there. Furthermore, he has 
established an Islamic police force, which is separate from the Afghan National Police 
(ANP) and is alleged to have perpetrated numerous human rights abuses.113 
 
Such examples of men who operate with impunity outside the rule of law serve to 
confirm in the minds of many Afghans that politics will continue to be dominated by 
the same faces, and that the central government’s talk of change is empty rhetoric. 
Afghanistan’s electoral law act (Art. 15, No. 3) “prohibits anyone who commands or 
belongs to an unofficial military force or armed group from becoming a candidate,” 
and vetting procedures have been developed to perform background checks on those 
who wish to run for office. The Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission 
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maintains a national database of illegal armed groups, yet when the Commission 
named 1,024 candidates for the 2005 parliamentary election as having ties to such 
organisations, only 34 were actually disqualified from the ballot.114 Four years later, 
the ballot for the 2009 presidential election featured at least 70 candidates with ties to 
known illegal armed groups.115 In addition, both of Karzai’s vice presidential running 
mates were accused of massive abuses of human rights and war crimes.116 A number 
of agreements have been made to shield commanders from prosecution for their role 
in wartime atrocities, including a motion carried in the Afghan Parliament on 
February 1st, 2007 to grant blanket immunity to all Afghans who had fought in the 
civil war, including senior Taliban representatives. Opinion polls have consistently 
shown that the culture of impunity which surrounds the country’s most powerful 
warlords has had disastrous effects on the morale of the Afghan people, leaving many 
feeling disenfranchised and cynical about the chances of real political reform being 
carried out. Allowing the warlords to extend their reach into the state has also 
provided them with yet another means of protecting their parochial interests. In short, 
the strategy of transforming warlords into politicians, businessmen, or “peacelords” 
has failed. While some commanders should be seen as having more legitimacy than 
others, the Afghan government and the international community must take a strong 
stand against predatory figures if there is to be any chance of success for the political 
reconstruction process. 
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3.3 The Taliban and Armed Spoiler Groups 
 
The word “Taliban” is the plural of the Arabic word taleb, meaning “seeker” (of 
truth). The term generally refers to students of Islam, giving rise to the name which 
the organisation that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 adopted for itself. The 
leaders of the Taliban movement were heavily influenced by a fundamentalist line of 
Deobandi Islam, which they were exposed to at madrassas along the Afghan-Pakistani 
border, especially in the Northwest Frontier Province. While it is generally believed 
that the proportion of madrassas preaching messages of violence is extremely 
small,117 the Taliban in Afghanistan has certainly proven to be open to the use of 
violence to oppose the international community’s state-building efforts there. The 
Taliban’s rapid rise to power from 1994 to 1996 was due in large part to its ability to 
provide security and recruit effectively at the grass-roots level, but the leaders’ strict 
interpretation of Islamic law and Pashtunwali norms of social conduct soon cost the 
Taliban much of the popularity it had gained. Since the US-led invasion ousted the 
Taliban regime from power in 2001, the movement has survived as an insurgency. 
 
3.3.1 Asymmetric Warfare and the Taliban’s Tactics 
 
Ethnically, the Taliban is an essentially Pashtun movment, but it is an amalgam of 
various groups ranging from religiously indoctrinated young people to 
disenfranchised peasants fighting for a better wage, to villagers following the 
directions of tribal or clan elders, or acting under duress. Locally hired fighters are 
often recruited as ground troops for the Taliban’s offensives, and are classified by 
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NATO forces as “Tier Two Taliban.” They are believed in general to be less tactically 
sophisticated than the “Tier One Taliban” veterans who fought against the Soviets and 
the Northern Alliance, but second-tier fighters are able to be employed on a part-time 
basis, returning to their villages after the conclusion of an operation. This makes it 
extremely difficult for NATO’s combat troops to identify the enemy, and has 
sometimes led to a blurring of the distinction between civil and military targets. With 
NATO forces repeatedly causing civilian casualties, it is little wonder that the 
international presence has become less welcome in many parts of Afghanistan. 
 
As a result of the Taliban’s recruitment strategy and its ability to blend into the local 
population before, after, and during engagements, the international forces in 
Afghanistan face a very agile enemy capable of both attrition tactics and full-scale 
frontal offensives such as that seen in the battle of Panjwai in 2006. Although the 
Taliban’s focus before 2006 was primarily on “soft targets” such as aid workers and 
government employees, the movement has become much bolder in more recent years 
and now attacks military targets and training facilities for the police and army as well. 
Anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines have been laid overnight around NATO 
positions, and long-distance rocket attacks have been used to hit moving convoys. The 
Taliban has also carried out increasingly sophisticated ambushes, sometimes using 
secondary remote-detonated explosive devices to target rescuers as well. 
 
Because of the resilience of the Taliban insurgency, state-building efforts were largely 
neglected at first, in favour of reforming the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 
providing security through NATO and its local allies. 
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3.3.2 Other Spoiler Groups Supporting the Taliban 
 
A number of other groups have declared their support for the Taliban, and have 
played a part in undermining the Kabul government. Notably, the Hizb-i Islami party 
leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar declared in a video broadcast sent to Al-Jazeera in 2006 
that he is willing to “fight under the banner of al-Qaeda.” Hekmatyar holds strongly 
anti-Western views, and has maintained close links with the Taliban since 2001, 
directing much of the insurgent activity around the provinces of Laghman, Logar, 
Paktiya, and Nangarhar. 
 
Al-Qaeda itself remains an active force for instability, even if the threat it poses to the 
entire Western way of life has been somewhat exaggerated. At the time of writing, it 
remains unclear what effect the assassination of the organisation’s leader, Osama bin 
Laden, will have on the operational capacity of al-Qaeda, but there are certainly those 
such as bin Laden’s former deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who have the potential to 
take command of the terrorist network. British intelligence has found over a hundred 
al-Qaeda operatives directing Taliban activities within Afghanistan, 118 and the links 
between the two organisations have been well documented. 
 
The Taliban is also supported by Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leaders of the 
so-called “Haqqani network” which is thought to have been responsible for numerous 
attacks, including the Kabul bombing in May, 2010 and an attempt on Karzai’s life in 
April, 2008. Jalaluddin originally rose to prominence during the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, and had significant success in attracting foreign backers who were eager 
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to sponsor anti-Soviet resistance. Although not initially affiliated with the Taliban, he 
aligned himself with the movement once it had taken control of the country, and 
accepted a government post as governor of Paktiya province and Taliban Minister of 
Borders and Tribal Affairs.119 While in power, he was accused of ethnic cleansing 
against the local Tajik minority.120 Both Jalaluddin and his son Sirajuddin, who has 
taken over more operational control as his father has aged,121 have eluded capture and 
are thought to be operating out of North Waziristan on the Afghan-Pakistani border. 
Today, the Haqqani network is considered by NATO military officials to be the most 
resilient enemy network operating in Afghanistan.122 Believing that Sirajuddin could 
be enticed to withdraw his support for the Taliban, Karzai has offered him the 
position of Prime Minister in the Kabul government. 
 
The existence of groups like the Haqqani network, al-Qaeda and the Hizb-i Islami 
party has troubling implications for state-building. Not only does the continued 
presence of armed spoiler groups in support of the insurgency force institutional 
reforms and personnel training to be carried out in a conflict environment, but it 
complicates the task of coordinating international assistance to the state-building 
project. The goal of combating an insurgency requires different priorities from those 
which would be necessary to provide the rule of law and strengthen the government’s 
legitimacy. In addition, the leverage which these groups have with the Kabul 
government increases as deadlines for the withdrawal of foreign troops approach. 
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3.3.3 Peace Talks 
 
At the 2010 International Afghanistan Conference in London, President Karzai 
announced his intention to hold a Peace Jirga to end the Taliban insurgency by 
reaching a compromise with more moderate members of the Taliban who might be 
willing to lay down their arms. The event was held in June, 2010, and it was hoped 
that it would allow the formation of a national consensus on how to approach peace 
talks with the hard-line Islamic extremists, isolating the extremists from those 
genuinely wanting an end to violence. The Peace Jirga was intended to be a major 
public forum for consultation, similar to the two Loya Jirgas held in 2001 (to confirm 
Karzai as the head of Afghanistan’s transitional administration) and 2003-4 (to 
approve the Afghan constitution), but the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami did not send 
representatives. Taliban leaders announced the launch of a new offensive against 
foreign troops and diplomats, and publicly condemned the Peace Jirga, reiterating 
their stance that they would not hold peace talks until all international troops had left 
Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Hekmatyar offered his own terms for peace in a fifteen-
point plan which included several controversial demands, including immediate 
elections and the departure of foreign troops as early as July, 2010. The insurgency 
and the spoiler groups perpetuating it remain as important challenges to the country’s 
security and the viability of the Afghan state. 
 
3.4 Opium and the Illegal Economy 
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Afghan society is permeated by the opium trade. The export of illegal drugs fuels 
corruption, warlordism, and the Taliban-led insurgency, generating a wide range of 
governance and security issues. Since 1991, Afghanistan has consistently been the 
largest opium producer in the world.123 From 2009-2010, the production of opiates 
was halved,124 but the rise in prices which has accompanied this downturn may 
increase the risk that more farmers will turn back towards poppy cultivation in the 
years to come. Interestingly, 98% of opium production and 96% of poppy cultivation 
was concentrated in the southern and western parts of the country, where the 
insurgency is the most active and the security situation most fragile. This seems to 
support the connection between opium production and insecurity which was observed 
in 2007.125 In any case it is still too early to celebrate a definite change in momentum, 
and the opium trade remains an enormous challenge for Afghanistan and the 
international community. 
 
Billions of dollars have been spent on counter-narcotics programmes, including aerial 
spraying, public education campaigns, and alternative lifestyle programmes. There is 
now a general consensus that any effective response to the poppy boom will require 
an integrated, nation-wide strategy with support from local communities. Trained 
security forces and specialist counter-narcotics police will be required to contain 
production, rather than simply displacing it from one region to the next, but security 
forces on their own will never be sufficient to resolve the problem at its root. In this 
context, it is worth noticing that the most effective counter-narcotics measure ever 
taken in Afghanistan was grounded in an appeal to Islamic culture. In July, 2000, 
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Mullah Omar issued an edict declaring opium to be haram (un-Islamic), and over the 
following year production fell to just 185 tonnes. This underscores the need for a 
solution to enlist the support of local communities. 
 
Figure 1: Annual Opium Production in Afghanistan: 1995-2010
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      Source: United Nations. “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010,” Kabul: UNODC, 2010. 
 
 
It has been estimated that after unofficial taxes from warlords, local authorities and 
Taliban commanders, less than 2% of the profits from the $30 billion global heroin 
trade actually benefits the 3,300,000 farmers involved in cultivation and 
production.126 Survival, debt-relief and the desire for profits used to be the main 
reasons why farmers planted poppy crops,127 but traditional practices of money-
lending in Afghanistan’s agricultural sector have gradually placed debt-laden farmers 
into positions of permanent dependence. These lending practices, or salaam, involve a 
monetary advance on anticipated future crop production, and interest rates tend to be 
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punitively high. The Taliban has also been known to send “night letters” threatening 
farmers if they attempt to discontinue poppy planting.128 
 
3.4.1 Spoilers Involved in the Drug Trade 
 
The Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade in Afghanistan has steadily increased, 
especially in the southern half of the country. Before Mullah Omar’s ban on poppy 
cultivation, the Taliban levied “Islamic taxes” on opium of up to 20%.129 Today’s 
drugs are taxed similarly, with a levy of 10% being paid by farmers directly to the 
Taliban or militia commanders, depending on whoever exercises the most authority in 
the region. Laboratories are taxed up to 15% of their revenues, and transit fees of 15% 
are also charged.130 These revenues are a major component of the financing of the 
insurgency. 
 
The drug trade has also been a source of corruption in the Afghanistan’s national 
security forces. The post of Chief of Police in poppy-growing districts has actually 
been auctioned off, with prices reaching as high as $100,000 for a six-month job 
salaried at $60 per month.131 Such positions are sought after because of the lucrative 
bribes which can be extorted for smugglers in return for protection, and even 
assistance in transporting narcotics. 
 
3.5 External Spoilers 
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The process of state-building does not take place in a vacuum, and attention must be 
given to regional actors that might play a destabilising role from beyond the borders 
of Afghanistan. Most noteworthy in this regard is Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Intelligence Directorate (ISI). In addition, Iran seems to be trying to sustain the 
conflict for as long as possible, without actually pushing Afghanistan all the way 
towards state collapse, and could therefore be considered a type of spoiler as well. 
 
3.5.1 Pakistan’s Intelligence Services 
 
The ISI is the largest of Pakistan’s intelligence services, and is responsible for 
providing national security analysis for the government, and for coordinating 
intelligence activities for the three branches of the Pakistani military. 
When the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in , President 
Musharraf officially decided to end support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, but 
it is not clear how much control he actually exerted over the ISI. Ethnically, the ISI is 
dominated by Pathuns (Pakistani Pashtuns), and has strong sympathies with the 
Taliban. 
 
Since its formation in 1947, Pakistan’s government has adopted the view that its 
national security in the event of a conventional war with India depends on “strategic 
depth,” or the idea that Afghanistan on the western border should be cultivated as an 
allied territory to which Pakistani forces could retreat if necessary. Although Pakistan 
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developed a nuclear arsenal in 1998, some elements in the ISI remain convinced of 
the importance of strategic depth as an element of national defence.132 
 
3.5.2 Iran 
 
Iran’s role in Afghanistan is somewhat ambiguous. Herat and Kandahar were part of 
the Persian Empire until 1747, and Iran still shares a common language and culture 
with a significant portion of Afghanistan. There has also been considerable labour 
migration from Afghanistan to Iran, due to the latter country’s much higher levels of 
economic development, and Iran currently hosts some 935,600 Afghan refugees.133 
Iran is very much in favour of an Afghan regime capable of accepting the repatriation 
of these refugees, and of containing the tremendous flow of opium and heroin across 
the border. In some ways, Tehran has been extremely supportive of the Karzai 
government, and has contributed to a great many infrastructure projects, including 
hospital renovations, road and railway construction projects, and an initiative to open 
Afghan access to the port of Chabahar. However, Iran is also concerned over the 
implications of long-term US military deployments in the region, especially given the 
proximity of Shindand airbase to the Iranian border. 134 Shipments of Iranian weapons 
have been intercepted on their way to the Kandahar region, and there have been 
allegations that Iran has made significant financial contributions to some Afghan 
MPs.135 Some reports have even claimed that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
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Corps directly supports groups of Shia insurgents within Afghanistan.136 The longer 
international forces are deployed in Afghanistan, the more the domestic populations 
of the donor countries will tend to tire of dangerous, expensive foreign adventures. 
This would obviously benefit Iran, and it is possible the government of that country 
simply wishes to prolong the international intervention in Afghanistan as much as it 
can without actually destabilising its neighbour irrevocably. Whatever its ultimate 
strategy, Iran has at least the potential to play a significant destabilising role, and 
could dramatically step up its support for the insurgents in a very short time. 
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4: Addressing the Challenges to State-Building 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned previously, a consensus has developed in academic and policy-making 
circles that durable state-building reforms require a functioning security sector, acting 
for the benefit of the entire population. The European Union endorsed this view in the 
2003 European Security Strategy, which prioritises reform of the security sector and 
notes that in a failed state environment, many of the security institutions which would 
normally serve to consolidate state-building efforts may be corrupted, 
underdeveloped, or absent entirely. The field of SSR concerns itself with reorganising 
the various security institutions so that they can effectively and efficiently fulfil their 
roles. Over the long term, the SSR process is essential for inspiring trust in the 
population towards the institutions of central government. Unreformed security actors 
can also be decisive obstacles to state-building and to peace and stability in a broader 
sense. Many communities in Afghanistan view the police in particular as a predatory 
organisation, and associate the ANP with abuses of human rights and demands for 
bribes and illegal taxes.137 Given the challenges of warlordism, an active insurgency 
with support from within Afghanistan and from beyond its borders, and an illegal 
economy sustained in no small part by the threat of violence, SSR must be an integral 
part of the political reconstruction process in Afghanistan. This chapter describes the 
involvement of the European Union in SSR initiatives to support the overall state-
building project. 
                                                 
137 R. Perito. “Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform.” Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2009. 
 82 
 
4.2 The Security Sector in Afghanistan 
 
A brief list of key security sector actors in Afghanistan would include the police, 
border guards, armed forces, security and intelligence services, and non-statutory 
actors such as political party militias, guerrilla armies, and private security companies. 
According to OECD guidelines which have been adopted by the EU, customary and 
traditional justice structures, prison staff, prosecuting attorneys, and criminal 
investigation units form part of the security sector fabric as well, and must be 
incorporated into the reform process.138 Reforming the security sector is clearly a very 
broad undertaking, requiring a holistic approach and coordination among a variety of 
civil, military, and paramilitary organisations. However, the police and the judiciary 
are by far the most urgent priorities in Afghanistan, and no state which remains 
incapable of providing its population with basic personal security and justice can 
possibly sustain the loyalty or support of its inhabitants. The EU has therefore 
undertaken to build up the civilian policing capacities of the ANP, and to improve 
linkages between the police and the justice sector. 
 
4.2.1 The Political Framework for International Partnership in Afghanistan 
 
The EU has taken a number of steps to formalise a partnership with Afghanistan 
within the context of broader international engagement there. Officially, the United 
Nations has led and coordinated international efforts at political reconstruction and 
humanitarian assistance. While this has not prevented the development of bilateral 
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relationships between Afghanistan and various international actors, including the EU, 
for many years the UN-brokered Bonn Agreement of 2001 did provide the primary 
framework for international engagement in Afghanistan. The Bonn Agreement also 
provided the foundation for the post-conflict political settlement. This initial 
agreement was followed in 2002 by the National Development Framework, which 
laid the foundations for state-building and identified primary focal areas for 
diminishing the scale of humanitarian disasters. 
 
A number of new commitments followed, often accompanied by reassessments of the 
situation, redistributions of resources and strategic priorities, and general attempts to 
adapt to the challenges posed by a dysfunctional Afghan security environment. The 
European Union’s 2003-2006 Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan set out the key 
focal areas of EU engagement, notably in health, economic infrastructure, rural 
development and food safety, and institutional capacity-building. In 2004, the 
Constitution for the new Afghan regime was enacted, committing Afghanistan to a 
vision of a liberal, democratic Islamic republic with respect for the norms of human 
rights and international law. European commitments to support Afghanistan’s 
transition towards such an open access political order were staunchly reaffirmed in the 
2005 Joint Declaration, which established regular political dialogue through meetings 
at the ministerial level, and promised additional support to the Afghan government in 
the areas of justice sector reform and SSR.139 Later, the London Conference of 
January, 2006 provided a political framework for cooperation between Afghanistan 
and the EU, and resulted in the signing of the 2006 Afghanistan Compact. The 
development goals of the Afghanistan Compact were prioritised more specifically in 
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an interim Afghan National Development Strategy (i-ANDS), a final version of which 
was adopted at the Paris Conference of June, 2008. This finalised version of the 
Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) included measures designed to 
coordinate national development through the Afghan government, thereby helping the 
country to qualify for debt relief. A major focus was on promoting local ownership of 
the political reconstruction process. The EU’s 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper for 
Afghanistan was also drafted to respond to changes in the situation in Afghanistan. 
The focal areas of the current Country Strategy Paper are health, rural development, 
and governance, all three of which are priority sectors of the ANDS. Social 
protection, anti-mining action, and regional cooperation are identified as further (non-
focal) areas of concern, restating the EU’s holistic approach not only to SSR but to 
state-building in general. Most recently as of the time of writing, the EU endorsed the 
outcomes of the January, 2010 London Conference and the July, 2010 Kabul 
Conference, each of which once again reaffirmed international commitments to 
Afghanistan while reflecting on the need for increasing Afghan ownership of the 
national security forces. 
 
The security sector itself has been divided into five key areas, each of which is the 
responsibility of a specific international donor organisation. The five “pillars” of SSR 
consist of: reform of the ANA; counter-narcotics; Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants; justice sector reform; and police reform. 
The United States government manages the reform of the ANA, while Japan has taken 
on lead nation status in the DDR pillar. European governments have organised 
reforms in the other areas, with the United Kingdom taking the lead on counter-
narcotics and Italy overseeing justice sector reform. Police reform was initially 
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managed by Germany through the German Police Project Office (GPPO), but was 
subsequently taken over by the European Commission after it became clear that 
achieving the objectives of this pillar of the SSR process would require wider 
participation and larger commitments than the GPPO could provide on its own. 
EUPOL Afghanistan was therefore launched in 2007 as a non-executive civilian 
mission committed to developing the capabilities of Afghanistan’s police, and to 
coordinating multilateral support for police reform. 
 
4.2.2 European Engagement in Afghanistan 
 
 
The  European presence in Afghanistan is visible in several ways, especially within 
the security sector. Notably, the EU and its Member States have pledged some 8 
billion euros to Afghanistan over the period of 2002-2010,140 and with contributions 
of 270.5 million euros, the EU Delegation continues to be the single largest donor to 
the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), which pays the running costs of the ANP. 
The expenditures of the LOTFA are prioritised as follows: 
1) Support for police forces to perform their duties effectively and efficiently 
2) Building financial and project management capacity within the Ministry of 
the Interior 
3) Providing police forces with equipment necessary for improving their 
mobility and responsiveness (radios equipment, vehicles, etc.) 
4) Improving the working and living conditions of police, with a view to 
raising efficiency and morale 
5) Improving gender balance within the police forces 
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6) Supporting uniformed personnel of the Central Prisons Department 
 
The EU has also provided an additional 15 million euros to the Counter-Narcotics 
Trust Fund, and 20 million euros for the German-run Project for Alternative 
Livelihoods, which is needed for providing farmers involved in the cultivation of 
opium poppies with alternative sources of sustainable income. The multilateral 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which provides a reliable source of 
revenue for recurring government expenses such as salaries, maintenance, and annual 
development budgets, has received over 200 million euros from the Commission. 
Together, twenty-five EU Member States have contributed approximately 35,000 
troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and several 
states have made separate contributions of troops to the US-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan.141 
A further 141 million euros have been channelled into the health sector, along with 35 
million for electoral support and observation during the 2009/2010 electoral cycle. 
 
In addition to its financial contributions and the financial and troop contributions of 
its Member States, the EU is currently represented in Afghanistan by the European 
Commission Delegation and the office of the EU Special Representative (EUSR). The 
EUSR was initially created in 2001 to give the EU more of a voice in a US-dominated 
political environment, and to coordinate Member State contributions to Afghanistan. 
Since that time, the position has developed into something of an information-sharing 
role that fulfils the additional functions of improving coherence between different EU 
instruments and actors, and updating the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in 
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Brussels with recent developments. Since April, 2010, the post has been occupied by 
Vygaudas Usackas of Lithuania. 
 
However, by far the most visible aspect of the European presence in the country is the 
EUPOL Afghanistan mission. This police assistance mission was launched in 2007 as 
a non-executive civilian operation conceived within the framework of the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). EUPOL Afghanistan was established with the 
following mandate: 
“[to] significantly contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and 
effective civilian policing arrangements, which will ensure appropriate interaction with the 
wider criminal justice system, in keeping with the policy advice and institution building work 
of the Community, Member States, and other international actors. Further, the mission will 
support the reform process towards a trusted and efficient police force, which works in 
accordance with international standards, within the framework of the rule of law, and respects 
human rights.” 142 
To achieve these goals, the mission staff was instructed to develop an operational plan 
grounded in the principles agreed to in the Afghanistan Compact and the i-ANDS, and 
to work with the Afghan government and other international actors to implement that 
plan. EUPOL Afghanistan has subsequently taken on a major role coordinating the 
actions of US-led police reform efforts with those of other contributors to police 
reform, such as national contingents embedded in the Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) structure. The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) serves as an 
important forum for this coordination, but lacks the ability to make binding decisions 
of its own. 
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While the mission’s original mandated strength was 200 international staff, the EU 
agreed in May, 2008 to increase that figure to 400 staff. Unfortunately, there is a 
significant shortfall in personnel, with only 306 international seconded and contracted 
staff as of November, 2010.143 The mission consists of 168 police officers, 49 rule of 
law experts, and 89 civilian experts. The EUPOL Afghanistan headquarters in Kabul 
accommodates 217 of these staff members, including the 5 assigned to the IPCB 
Secretariat. A further 85 operate across 13 provinces outside the capital, and 4 provide 
support and evaluation from Brussels through the Mission Support Element. 
 
Given how vocally the international community has continued to affirm its 
commitment to state-building in Afghanistan, it is striking that there is a lack of 
formalised arrangements between EUPOL Afghanistan and its US-led counterpart, the 
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), which has been operating since 
2009.  Nevertheless, for the most part, the basic division of labour appears to be clear. 
As part of ISAF, the NTM-A leads efforts on developing the ANA, and on large-scale 
recruitment, equipping, and training for ANP officers throughout Afghanistan. 
Meanwhile, the EU mission provides strategic and civilian policing expertise to the 
ANP and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.144 This work includes building up the 
ANP’s ability to carry out criminal investigations, deliver intelligence-led policing, 
raise awareness of gender issues, and combat official corruption. Although addressing 
other challenges such as the exceptionally high attrition rate and widespread illiteracy 
could well be considered requirements for the development of civilian policing 
capabilities, the British government has indicated that it considers such measures to 
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fall within the NTM-A’s area of responsibility.145 Nonetheless, the EU has played an 
active role in helping the Afghan Ministry of the Interior formulate a national police 
plan which covers steps for improving the equipment, professional appearance, and 
living and working conditions of ANP officers – all steps which were designed to help 
alleviate the rate of attrition of new recruits. The EU may well have more 
contributions to make in terms of addressing literacy and attrition rates, and it would 
be advantageous to formally specify the nature of the relationship between EUPOL 
Afghanistan and the NTM-A. 
 
4.3 The Police Sector in Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan possessed no unified national police force before the international 
intervention in the country. The police were organised as a paramilitary force which 
operated largely outside the rule of law, leading to a situation of widespread popular 
mistrust which has to some extent continued even after the arrival of international 
forces.146 Most of the estimated 50,000 officers in service before 2001 were illiterate, 
untrained, and poorly equipped. In addition to these obstacles to performance, many 
officers owed their allegiance to local commanders or warlords, rather than to a 
central government. Low salaries and the dangerous nature of the job have also 
contributed to an entrenched culture of corruption within the police, as officers seek to 
provide for their families and enrich themselves. Addressing the issue remains 
difficult because the powers of actually changing hiring practices and training 
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techniques rest with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, and this organisation faces its 
own problems of corruption.147 State-building efforts in Afghanistan since 2002 have 
therefore required not only the rapid build-up of police capabilities, but also the 
development of structures and training procedures to improve transparency and 
accountability within the police. Efforts to combat corruption have met with some 
success, but the problem remains serious, with only 55% of Afghans surveyed in 2010 
indicating that they believed the ANP was “capable” of handling issues of corruption, 
and only 17% believing the police to be “very capable.”148 
 
4.3.1 Composition of the Police in Afghanistan 
 
The overarching police force of the Afghan government is the ANP, which operates 
under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. The ANP is currently comprised of 
the following organisations: the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP); the Criminal 
Investigation Division (CID); the Afghan Border Police (ABP); the Afghan Customs 
Police (ACP); the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP); the Counter-
Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA); the Counter-Terrorism Police (CTP); and 
the Afghanistan National Fire Department. The Standby Police and the Afghan 
Highway Police (AHP) also operated under the banner of the ANP, but are now no 
longer in existence. In addition, in 2006 the Afghan National Auxiliary Police force 
(ANAP) was established outside the ANP to assist in counterinsurgency operations on 
a temporary basis. It was dismantled, but has arguably been replaced by similar 
institutions which closely resemble the ANAP in scope and form. 
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By far the largest of all these forces is the AUP. With an authorised strength 
(tashkeel) of 82,000, it is responsible for routine civilian policing activities such as 
discovering crime, arresting and charging suspects, maintaining the peace, and 
protecting public and private property. At the regional command level, regular reports 
must be made to the Deputy Minister for Security within the Ministry of the Interior. 
The CID is responsible for investigating criminal offences under Afghan law, and has 
an authorised strength of 4,148. The ABP concerns itself with airport and border 
security, and has an authorised strength of 18,000. The ACP enforces customs 
regulations, and operates under the authority of the Minister of Finance. ANCOP was 
conceived of as an elite rapid-reaction force which was eventually intended to have 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) capabilities. Since its establishment, it has 
been deployed to bolster ANP operations in Afghanistan’s seven largest cities. With a 
mandatory 16-week training period, this force is better trained and equipped than both 
the AUP and the ANAP, and is aimed at dealing with “advanced police situations” 
such as hostage-taking, riots, civil disorder, and large-scale looting. Although its 
authorised strength is only 5,442, this number is likely to increase. The authorised 
strength of the CNPA is 2,958. This force specialises in counter-narcotics 
investigations and reports directly to the Deputy Minister for Counter-Narcotics 
within the Ministry of the Interior, but is still considered part of the ANP. The CTP is 
the lead law enforcement agency in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency 
operations, and has an authorised strength of 406. Lastly, the National Fire 
Department is responsible for fire suppression, prevention, and rescue. Its authorised 
strength is 882, and it operates throughout the entire country. 
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The Standby Police, predecessors to ANCOP, have now been phased out, along with 
the notoriously corrupt and inefficient AHP. Officers originally working in the AHP 
had been responsible for highway security, and were at first slated by the Ministry of 
the Interior for redeployment to border patrols and dangerous areas of the countryside 
where shortfalls in the local police numbers were causing problems. However, due to 
the refusal of many officers to relocate, especially to dangerous areas in southern 
Afghanistan, talks have been held over the establishment of a new body which could 
resume the duties of the old AHP. 
 
The ANAP was established in 2006 to allow the central administration a greater 
measure of control over militias loyal to local governors and warlords. Typically, this 
was achieved by simply recruiting militiamen as auxiliary police officers, providing 
them with ten days of training and a one-year contract, and deploying them in high-
risk provinces to bolster counter-insurgency efforts. Such steps tend to have little 
effect on underlying loyalties.149 Due to the hasty establishment of the ANAP during 
a time of increased insurgency in the south of the country, there was some 
controversy over whether the organisation was really created as a predominantly 
military institution, or whether it was originally intended to function as a civilian 
police force, as stated in its Terms of Reference. The ANAP was dismantled in 2008, 
but the Afghan Public Protection Programme (APPP, or AP3) was created in 2009 
under similar conditions and closely resembles the ANAP in many respects. The latest 
iteration of this programme is the Local Defence Initiative or Community Defence 
Initiative (LDI/CDI). Under this programme, locally recruited personnel are trained 
by international military forces and shown techniques for how to guard certain areas 
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designated as “Key Terrain Districts,” which are considered to provide a tactical 
advantage to forces controlling them. The paramilitary training which cadets must 
undergo is significantly different from the training needed to build civilian policing 
capacity. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) which were established in mid-2010 
augment the capabilities of the LDI/CDI forces, and resemble the AP3 in scope and 
constitution. There is some doubt as to the loyalty of these local auxiliary police to the 
central government, and a recent report by a sub-committee of the British House of 
Lords raised concerns over whether this group “could challenge the authority of the 
state, collude with local warlords, use their firearms improperly, instil fear in the 
population, and engage in corruption or the drug trade.”150 Strengthening command 
and control structures within the police remains a high priority. Exploiting traditional 
security structures to fill a security vacuum may be tempting, but mobilising local 
militias contradicts the Afghan government’s Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups 
programme (DIAG), and sends a strong message that the government is not 
committed to the disarmament process. Arming ethnically imbalanced militias may 
have the additional effect of straining inter-ethnic relations if other groups fear 
persecution. 
 
The Afghanistan Compact established a target for 2010 of creating a fully constituted, 
professional, functional, and ethnically balanced ANP force of up to 62,000 members, 
but in 2007, this number was increased to 82,000 (including 18,500 border police) by 
the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) in an effort to combat an 
increasingly violent insurgency. Later, amid fears that the 2009 presidential elections 
would spark widespread violence across the country, the ANP’s authorised strength 
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was raised to 96,800. In January, 2010, the JCMB approved further force strength 
increases of 109,000, to be achieved by October, 2010, and 134,000, to be reached by 
October, 2011. These increases have raised concerns within the donor community 
about the fiscal sustainability of the ANP, and whether it is truly possible to provide 
the level of police coverage needed to provide security in certain areas, especially in 
the southern and eastern parts of the country. 
 
4.3.2 State of the Police Sector in Afghanistan 
 
When the international community first intervened in Afghanistan, the challenge 
facing donors in the field of police reform was to build up an Afghan-led force 
capable of simultaneously performing counter-insurgency tasks and providing civilian 
policing. This required not only the recruitment of large numbers of officers, but also 
the provision of specialised training structures designed to improve specific skills, 
including basic literacy. With heavy ethnic imbalances and most officers showing 
loyalty to their regional commanders instead of to the Ministry of the Interior, the 
police had become a highly factionalised institution. The police had neither the 
training, nor the resources, nor the organisational structure necessary to accommodate 
the security needs of the population. Organised as a paramilitary institution, the police 
functioned as “a coercive arm of the state rather than a national civilian police 
force,”151 and were widely mistrusted in Afghan society. Police involvement in 
kidnappings, bank robberies, extortion, and drug trafficking contributed to a rising 
crime rate, and a general perception that the organisation was an active source of 
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insecurity, rather than a force for safeguarding the public.152 A spokesperson for the 
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission claimed that 15% of all reported 
human rights violations from May to November of 2004 had been carried out by the 
police themselves,153 and routine failure to prosecute cases involving murder and 
torture had left Afghanistan without a credible rule of law system.154 
 
4.3.3 Progress on Police Reform 
 
The police reform process was formally launched in March, 2002 when the German 
and Afghan Interior Ministries signed an agreement authorising the GPPO to oversee 
the training of Afghan police. From 2002 to 2006, the GPPO administered $80 
million of bilateral aid from Germany, re-estalbishing the National Police Academy in 
Kabul to offer training for commissioned officers (Saran) and non-commissioned 
personnel (Satanman). By the beginning of 2006, the Academy had produced 3,302 
graduates, including 251 Saran, 2,299 Satanman, and 752 border police.155 These 
numbers were clearly insufficient, even in 2006 in the context of the ANP’s relatively 
small force strength target of 62,000 officers, as set down in the Afghanistan 
Compact. The German training model effectively reconstituted the higher ranks of the 
police, reforming pay scales and matching police salaries to those of the ANA. A 
three-year training course was also provided to the Saran and one-year courses were 
provided for the Satanman, but the problem was that this strategy largely overlooked 
the training of rank-and-file patrolmen (Satunkai), who are the main interface between 
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the police and the population. The majority of Satunkai have a militia background and 
no formal police training, making them very poorly suited to community policing.156 
Consequently, the GPPO’s police reform strategy was slow to produce results, and the 
United States entered the process in 2003 to create a large-scale training system for 
Afghanistan’s rank-and-file police. 
 
US support was channelled through the private security corporation DynCorp 
International, which was contracted to construct a Central Training Centre in Kabul 
and seven Regional Training Centres around the country. The curriculum used at 
these training centres emphasised large-scale recruitment and a speedy period of 
formation, focusing on the paramilitary aspects of policing in an active conflict zone. 
By mid-2007, over 71,000 police officers had been trained through the US system. 
The training featured a five-week course for illiterate officers, a nine-week course for 
literate officers, and a fifteen-day Transition Integration Programme designed to re-
orient “veteran police.”157 
 
Early attempts at SSR revealed major differences between the US conception of the 
Afghan security sector actors and the German (and later, the European) vision for the 
Afghanistan’s security. Whereas the US-led development of the ANA involved 
creating a new institution from scratch, the German government was unprepared to 
allocate the resources which would have been necessary to create a corresponding 
civilian police force from scratch. Instead, disbanding the police was not entertained 
as a serious option due to the security vacuum which would be created, and Germany 
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was left with only one option: seeking to transform existing structures and personnel. 
The Afghan government endorsed the initial recruitment target of 62,000 for the ANP, 
based on calculations derived from the police-to-citizen ratio seen in Germany.158 
However, this figure proved to be unreasonably low for a country with low population 
density, a rugged geography, and an ongoing insurgency, and the rate at which the 
GPPO produced new recruits was far from meeting the requirements of the Afghan 
government. Subsequent increases in the target numbers have favoured the US 
approach of quickly training large classes of recruits, and on paper, the ANP consisted 
of 96,000 officers as of February, 2011. The actual number of officers active across 
the country is difficult to estimate, thanks to a significant attrition rate. 
 
Unfortunately, the quality of this training has often been questioned. Only about 10% 
of the recruits have met the literacy requirements for the nine-week course, which 
comes the closest to meeting the basic standards of police education that would be 
expected in a developed country.159 As of June, 2006, only 30,395 officers were 
judged to have met basic readiness criteria in terms of their training, unit staffing 
levels and equipment status.160 There have also been claims that the attrition rate 
among police may be as high as 75%.161 This is undoubtedly a high estimate, but 
2006 estimates of 15-30% suggest that whatever the true figures, the problem is 
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extremely widespread.162 Attrition may be due to a number of factors, not least of 
which is the dangerous nature of the job. The Taliban has consistently identified the 
ANP as a more visible, softer target than the ANA or foreign troops, and the police 
have borne the brunt of the casualties during the insurgency.163 Other relevant factors 
may include the inadequacy of salaries and working conditions, the unwillingness of 
most officers to be deployed far from their homes and families, and disillusionment 
with corrupt processes. Ultimately, the job Afghanistan’s police are being asked to do 
is incredibly challenging, and involves elements of both civilian policing and military 
functions. 
 
With much of the US training model focused on preparing for the rapid deployment of 
large numbers of police (often in quasi-military roles such as manning checkpoints, 
securing objectives, and guarding static installations from the Taliban) the EUPOL 
Afghanistan mission remains the only multilateral mission providing training and 
expertise in civilian policing. The mission’s objectives have been formulated as: 
1) Developing police command, control and communications for the 
Ministry of the Interior and the ANP; 
2) Developing intelligence-led policing; 
3) Building the capabilities of the Criminal Investigation Department; 
4) Developing anti-corruption capacities; 
5) Improving coordination and cooperation between the police and 
judiciary, with special emphasis on prosecutors; and 
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6) Mainstreaming a culture of respect for human rights and gender 
equality in the Ministry of the Interior and the ANP. 
These priorities are pursued mainly through the activities of training, mentoring, 
monitoring and advising, and have resulted in a number of programmes planned in 
conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. Among these programmes have 
been the “Ring of Steel” initiative, setting up roadside vehicle checks outside busy 
entrances to Kabul, and the “Train the Trainers” programme, which aims to foster 
local ownership of the training process by educating senior Afghan police officers 
who may then pass on their training to subordinates in the hopes of creating a trickle-
down effect. Despite the achievements of EUPOL Afghanistan, the enormous 
resource gap which persists between EU and US contributions to police reform 
undermines the case for the EU to play a coordination role, and results in a continuing 
imbalance in the focus of police training. 
 
EUPOL Afghanistan was also hampered by several difficulties at its outset. 
Administrative and security problems prevented the mission staff from leaving base 
camp before certain equipment was procured (notably IT equipment and armoured 
vehicles), and the absence of a formal agreement between the EU and the NATO-led 
ISAF has caused delays in deploying staff through the PRTs. Technical agreements 
are required between the EU and each individual state in charge of a PRT, and in the 
case of Turkey and the US, such agreements have proven difficult to draft.164 
Similarly, trouble in procuring adequate numbers of staff has prevented EUPOL 
Afghanistan from making as much of an impact as had been hoped. Of the authorised 
400 personnel, only some 284 staff (including 90 local and 184 international officers) 
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are currently employed in Afghanistan.165 As a result, many areas of the country are 
simply not able to be covered, and efforts have often been confined to the five 
regional commands of Kabul, Mazar e-Sharif, Kandahar, Herat, and Bagram. 
Limitations in the geographic coverage of the EUPOL Afghanistan mission have 
negatively affected its ability to improve civilian policing in more remote rural areas, 
and have contributed to sharply differing popular perceptions about the police from 
one region to the next.166 
 
4.4 The Justice Sector in Afghanistan 
 
Justice sector reform consists of both top-down institutional reforms and bottom-up 
public access initiatives. Establishing the rule of law in a failed state environment 
requires there to be “legal norms and institutions necessary for the creation, 
interpretation, and application of the law,”167 and these are at the very core of any 
attempt to promote the rule of law. Police reform without accompanying reform to the 
justice sector is likely to fail, and in Afghanistan, even where the police have made 
arrests, the percentage of cases brought to trial and resulting in convictions has been 
minute. A key part of EUPOL Afghanistan’s mission must be coordinating police and 
justice sector reforms, in order to support the creation of a police force capable of not 
only discovering and processing evidence of crime, but of producing proper 
convictions as a result. 
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The major donors contributing towards justice sector reform are the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Norway, Canada, and the United Nations. 
Following the London Conference of 2006, the European Commission has also taken 
a greater hand in justice sector reform, improving the coordination between police and 
justice reform efforts in spite of the fact that they remain separate pillars of the overall 
SSR agenda. While judicial reforms did initially suffer from neglect and an overall 
lack of coordination both within the international community and between different 
Afghan agencies, the European Commission has become increasingly involved in 
justice sector reform since 2006, taking on a coordination role through its 
contributions to the LOTFA and to various PRTs administered by EU Member States. 
EUPOL Afghanistan mentors have also been placed in the judiciary to assist in 
developing a culture among Afghan police of respect for human rights and the rule of 
law. 
 
Drafting legislation, increasing the availability of legal aid, organising public 
awareness campaigns, and coordinating with other government priorities such as land 
reform, counter-narcotics, and anti-corruption measures are all important elements of 
justice sector reform. In addition, local justice mechanisms such as village jirgas and 
shuras must often be adjusted so that they conform to the national code of laws and to 
international standards of human rights. These tasks are particularly challenging in 
Afghanistan because many judges and their staff have very little training, and the 
infrastructure needed for a functioning judiciary is often missing. Although important 
progress has been made in the area of justice sector reform, it will remain a key 
challenge with major implications for the credibility of the Afghan government and 
the security sector as a whole. 
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4.4.1 Structure of the Justice Sector in Afghanistan 
 
The main permanent institutions which are engaged with and subject to justice sector 
reform are: the Ministry of Justice; the court system, headed by the Supreme Court; 
and the Office of the Attorney General. 
 
The Ministry of Justice often serves as the primary link between the court system and 
the people of Afghanistan. Within the Ministry of Justice, the Hoquq (General Legal 
Department) provides the public “face” of the Afghan justice system, and may 
conduct preliminary investigations before a case is brought to court.168 The Hoquq 
provides alternative dispute resolution services such as mediation, and any member of 
the public may turn to it for State-run dispute resolution. Although this department 
has offices in every district, by far the largest department in the Ministry of Justice is 
the Department of Prisons, which was run by the Ministry of the Interior before 2003. 
The Taqnin (Legal Drafting Department) is tasked with scrutinising all draft laws and 
ensuring their compatibility with the Constitution, Islamic law, and international legal 
standards. It provides a conduit between line ministries wishing to pass draft laws and 
the Council of Ministers, which is tasked with generating such laws. The Ministry of 
Justice also operates in a number of other areas, including policy formation, 
regulation, performance monitoring, implementing and coordinating the justice sector 
reform process laid down in the ANDS, and providing legal services to the 
population. 
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The courts are tasked with settling disputes that are not resolved in their preliminary 
stages by the Hoquq. The Constitution of Afghanistan establishes a 9-member Stera 
Mahkana (Supreme Court) with subordinate appeals courts and high courts. The Stera 
Mahkana has jurisdiction over constitutional disputes, and is the court of last resort 
for all appeals. Judges are appointed by the president with approval from the Wolesi 
Jirga (People’s House; the lower house of the Afghan Parliament), and serve 10-year 
terms. However, due to the country’s highly personalised power structures, this 
system of appointments undermines accountability and lends itself towards the 
politicisation of the judiciary. Judges are permitted to be trained in either civil or 
Islamic law, and in cases dealing with personal matters pertaining to those of the 
Shiite sect of Islam, the judiciary is able to apply the Shia school of law. 
Afghanistan’s legal system is based on a mixture of civil law and Sharia law, and 
does not recognise compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The 
Constitution of 2004 is the primary source of law, with statutes providing a secondary 
source. Islamic law may be applied where it is not in contradiction with statute or the 
Constitution, and customary law is regarded as a legitimate source of law in cases 
where a dispute is not covered by any of the other three sources. 
 
Authority over anti-corruption measures and the investigation of crimes rests with the 
Attorney General’s Office. According to Article 134 of the Constitution, the office is 
required to be completely independent, but in practice, the doctrine of judicial 
independence is compromised in Afghanistan. In early 2011, the current Attorney 
General, Mohammed Ishaq Aloko, accused US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry of 
overstepping his bounds by making the unusual and undiplomatic suggestion that the 
Attorney General step down from his position if he were not prepared to charge the 
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Chairman of the Afghan United Bank for fraud.169 The implication of Aloko’s 
response was that the Office of the Attorney General was under inappropriate pressure 
from the Americans, rather than from influential figures within Afghanistan, as had 
been suggested by un-named US officials quoted in the Washington Post prior to 
Eikenberry’s remarks.170 Nevertheless, Aloko was summoned to appear before 
Parliament in April, 2011 to answer accusations that his office was deliberately 
delaying investigations into high-profile political figures who were suspected of 
corruption. Deputy Attorney General Fazl Ahmed Faqiryar also alleged in 2010 that 
he was forced into retirement for pursuing such investigations.171 In addition to his 
suspected interference in anti-corruption proceedings, Aloko has also adopted a 
highly critical position on the results of the 2010 Parliamentary elections, expressing 
hope that a special court convened by Karzai to answer allegations of vote-rigging 
would void the results for roughly one quarter of the seats in the Wolesi Jirga.172 
Despite the clear need for scrutiny of the electoral process, there can be no doubt that 
the Attorney General’s Office has a highly politicised role. Aloko’s suggestion of 
bringing criminal charges of electoral fraud against those representatives occupying 
the disputed Parliamentary seats highlights why justice sector reform itself is an 
inescapably political process. 
 
4.4.2 State of the Justice Sector in Afghanistan 
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For several years following the American-led invasion of Afghanistan, little attention 
was devoted to reforming the judiciary, as compared to the tasks of training and 
equipping large numbers of security forces to assist in combat and counterinsurgency 
operations. According to a World Bank report for the fiscal year 2003-4, only 3% of 
expenditures in the security sector were devoted to justice sector reform.173 In 2004, 
Thier noted that “every aspect of a functioning judiciary is presently absent,”174 with 
many judges lacking any formal legal training at all. The judicial sector also lacked 
the necessary physical infrastructure to carry out its duties, and to some degree 
continues to suffer from a damaged infrastructure. Those court houses, prison 
facilities, law libraries, and prosecutors’ offices which do exist are often in poor 
condition or have been damaged by fighting. Proceedings are frequently conducted 
outdoors or in tents. Additional problems are posed by shortages of office supplies, 
computers, telephones, generators, furniture, vehicles, stationary, and other materials. 
Many judges even lack access to basic legal texts. Unsurprisingly, regional variation 
in the application of the law is very common, with some judges simply applying their 
own interpretation of Sharia law regardless of whether constitutional or statutory law 
should properly cover the issue in dispute.175 
 
Beyond the problems of resource shortages and an insufficient physical infrastructure, 
staffing problems further limit the effectiveness of the judiciary. Judges and their staff 
are sometimes forced to work in conditions of great personal danger, and there are far 
too few qualified candidates to fill the positions needed. A survey conducted by the 
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Supreme Court in 2006 revealed that a third of the country’s judges held no tertiary 
education qualifications, and some 400 posts remained vacant during the year, with no 
candidates qualified to fill them.176 The Access to Justice at the District Level 
programme, a 30-month UNDP project funded by the European Commission and 
launched in late 2005, was designed to refurbish the judicial infrastructure at the 
district level, which is the main point of contact for the Afghan people. However, with 
a budget of only 6 million euros, the programme was unable to make a significant 
impact. An evaluation report conducted in 2008 by the International Development 
Law Organisation (IDLO) to review two Italian projects found that in spite of the 
important progress being made in some areas, overall public perceptions of the justice 
sector remained negative.177 Restoring popular confidence in the judiciary remains 
one of the most important challenges for state-building in Afghanistan. 
 
4.4.3 Progress on Justice Sector Reform 
 
The European Commission has contributed to Afghanistan’s judicial reform in two 
main ways: through technical assistance towards the training of judges, lawyers, and 
other judicial staff; and through various financial contributions. These commitments 
have been channelled through several different mechanisms, the most important of 
which are the ARTF, the UNDP Access to Justice at the District Level programme, 
and the LOTFA, which pays the salaries of Central Prisons Department and Ministry 
of Justice personnel.178 Major achievements in justice sector reform have included the 
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drafting of several key pieces of legislation contributing to a greater harmonisation of 
Afghan law, and substantial rebuilding of the judicial infrastructure. Progress has also 
been made in providing training for judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers, and judicial 
police. Reforms to grading and pay systems have reduced discrepancies between 
judicial salaries and those of the ANP, but failure to ensure the safety of judges, 
witnesses, victims, and prosecutors continues to undermine the capacity of the court 
system to process criminal cases. Corruption also remains as a significant problem. 
 
The judicial reform strategy developed by the Afghan government in October, 2005, 
and entitled Justice for All, called for additional construction or rehabilitation of 
judicial buildings, including provincial courthouses, district court facilities, and 
offices for public prosecutors and Ministry of Justice officials. Various international 
donors have since offered support at each of these levels. USAID has made 
commitments to assist in the rebuilding of provincial judicial infrastructure, and 
reconstruction of the district courthouses has been largely managed through bilateral 
contributions by the PRTs. As the lead-nation on justice sector reform, Italy also 
funded repairs to prosecutors’ offices and the offices used by the Ministry of Justice 
in Kabul, and to the Faculty of Law and Political Science at Kabul University.179 
 
Until 2006, when the European Commission began to take a greater hand in justice 
sector reform, Italy was the lead nation for this pillar of the SSR strategy. Italian 
efforts were directed through the Italian Justice Office (IJO), which began operating 
in 2003 with four staff in Kabul. Advisors from various European donor countries 
were placed in the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Office of the 
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Attorney General, and several multilateral assistance missions were carried out 
between 2003 and 2006 to cater to a range of needs. These were intended to include 
the provision of legal training, institutional capacity building, prison system reform, 
legislative reform, and rebuilding of the judiciary’s physical infrastructure. The 
Access to Justice at the District Level programme also worked with traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms, which the majority of Afghans use instead of the formal court 
system. Unfortunately, these early efforts were seriously under-resourced, and the 
level of staffing provided by Italy proved to be far too small to make the necessary 
impact within the justice sector of Afghanistan. 
 
The Interim Training for the Afghan Judiciary programme, launched in July, 2003, 
was the first major training programme. Funded by Italy and managed by the IDLO, 
the programme provided some 500 judges, prosecutors, and Ministry of Justice staff 
with “skills-oriented” training over a period of 18 months. The IDLO has 
subsequently been responsible for two specialised training projects, funded by Italy 
and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), but these projects were 
sharply criticised by the Afghan government for failing to base the training on any 
kind of empirical needs-assessment of the justice sector’s most pressing priorities. 
The Provincial Justice Initiative, an Italian-led training programme launched in 2004, 
trained groups of Afghan trainers and deployed them across the country to help build 
institutional capacity at the sub-national level. This programme supplied training and 
equipment, including computers, generators, and mobile phones, to groups of fifty 
jurists per province across eight provinces, but was also criticised for failing to 
include any monitoring and evaluation component. It is therefore very difficult to 
identify specific impacts which this programme might have had. While the new 
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equipment did alleviate some administrative difficulties, many of those receiving 
training from the programme were not applying what they had learned, and 
monitoring undertaken by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) found that judges were “not applying fair trial standards or properly 
implementing the Interim Criminal Procedure Code.”180 The Stera Mahkana has since 
established a Judicial Training and Education Committee to coordinate the planning, 
implementation, and evaluation of staff training programmes. 
 
Since the European Commission took over from Italy as the “lead-nation” for justice 
sector reform, the government of Afghanistan has been taking increasing ownership 
of the justice sector reform process. To support this process, international 
commitments to justice sector reform were refocused in 2006 with the creation of the 
International Coordination Group on Justice Sector Reform. The direction of this new 
body was discussed at the Rule of Law Conference in Dubai in December, 2006, and 
at the Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of Law in Afghanistan, in July, 2007. At 
these conferences, representatives of the government of Afghanistan and of the major 
donors to justice sector reform agreed on several joint goals, underlying principles, 
and key actions, including the establishment of a National Justice Programme, a 
National Justice Sector Strategy, and a mechanism for pooling donor funding. The 
Rome Conference also resulted in the creation of an Afghan-led organisation which 
would be responsible for monitoring and evaluating justice reform initiatives under 
the auspices of the JCMB. With guidance from the UNAMA Rule of Law Office, the 
Afghan Ministry of Justice, the Stera Mahkana, and the Office of the Attorney 
General each prepared five-year plans for reform strategy as part of the ANDS 
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process. In November, 2007, these strategies were combined into the what is widely 
regarded as the best-developed of the ANDS strategies to date.181 The National 
Justice Programme and the National Justice Sector Strategy were finalised in March, 
2008, laying the foundations for the creation of the Project Oversight Committee 
(POC) composed of high-level officials from the Afghan government. This committee 
now sets the strategic agenda for prioritising justice sector reform initiatives. In 2010, 
the National Priority Programme entitled Law and Justice for All placed major focus 
on the parts of the legal system considered “most relevant to the way citizens 
experience the legal system and the rule of law.” This will entail meeting a series of 
targets for 2011, including: enacting the draft Criminal Procedure Code to replace the 
Interim Criminal Procedure Code; preparing commentaries on the Civil and Penal 
Codes to assist legal professionals in interpreting them; developing state policy and 
capacity for returning illegally seized lands; expanding the ambit of anti-corruption 
tribunals; and improving the provision of legal aid services. 
 
In terms of harmonising international support for reform of the Afghan judiciary, the 
European Commission has not taken on the same sort of coordination role that 
EUPOL Afghanistan was mandated to fulfil for the police sector. However, there are 
a number of linkages between European initiatives on police and justice sector 
reform. The staff of EUPOL Afghanistan includes significant numbers of justice and 
rule of law experts, and a Commission representative sits on the IPCB. Regular 
monthly meetings between the EUSR, the Commission, and EUPOL Afghanistan, as 
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well as more informal exchanges, have contributed to a close working relationship 
between the three.182 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
Since the European Commission took the lead on justice sector reform in 2006, and 
on police reform in 2007 through the EUPOL Afghanistan mission, coordination of 
the individual Member States’ contributions to both sectors has been greatly 
improved. Linkages have also been developed between the two sectors. Despite EU 
engagement becoming more holistic and better coordinated, though, staff and resource 
shortfalls remain the most serious threats to Europe’s performance in the Afghan 
theatre. EUPOL Afghanistan is operating well below its authorised personnel 
strength, with many positions failing to attract qualified applicants from the Member 
States. This is perhaps understandable, due to the dangerous conditions of the work, 
but if the European donors to the SSR process are serious about their commitments to 
supporting the emerging Afghan state, greater political and financial support will be 
essential. Seconding more professionals with the appropriate qualifications from the 
Member States will improve not only the effectiveness of the EU in coordinating 
police and justice sector reforms, but also the credibility of European civilian 
interventions in international eyes. The coordination of EU institutions and 
instruments with each other is especially important in this regard, and while the 
Commission, the EUSR, and EUPOL Afghanistan deserve praise for the work they 
have already done in strategically aligning their respective contributions, improving 
internal cohesion must be an ongoing focus. Brussels and the Member States must 
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develop a joint understanding of what sort of commitments they are genuinely 
prepared to make to Afghanistan. The role which Europe can claim for itself will be 
decided on the basis of this, and coordinating such holistic efforts as the EU has 
undertaken should be recognised as the demanding task it is. 
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5 Analysis and Conclusions 
 
When conducting dilemma analysis, it is essential for questions about the significance 
of each policy dilemma to be grounded in the local context. Chapter 3 of this thesis 
identified several challenging factors within the Afghan environment that are 
contributing to the emergence of these dilemmas. The most important factors were: 
the warlord problem and the culture of impunity which it has created; the ongoing 
insurgency, with its disruptive effects for state-building and the security sector; and 
the illegal economy, particularly with regard to the narcotics trade and the issues of 
corruption and unaccountability currently plaguing Afghanistan’s public institutions. 
It is no coincidence that the donor community has faced difficult policy dilemmas in 
Afghanistan. The specific constellation of challenges which exists there has created a 
situation in which the inherently contradictory aspects of externally assisted state-
building will necessarily force the international community to accept difficult trade-
offs. Not all international actors prefer to make the same choices when faced with 
these trade-offs, and although it may be possible to address some of the fragmentation 
of international efforts through increased information sharing, forging a truly unified 
strategic consensus means acknowledging that different strategies have different 
costs. This chapter will analyse the relationships between the contradictions of state-
building and the five most prominent policy dilemmas facing the donor community in 
Afghanistan. 
 
5.1 The Footprint Dilemma 
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The European Commission has made valuable contributions to Afghanistan’s police 
and justice sectors, but there is no question that the EU’s footprint is small relative to 
that of the United States. This is true in terms of the number of personnel deployed, as 
well as in regards to the level of financial support being given, and the intrusiveness 
of the EU’s mission. In all three of these ways, the US presence as a donor to the SSR 
process dwarfs that of the EU. 
 
5.1.1 Externally Supplied Personnel 
 
The staff ceiling of 400 for EUPOL Afghanistan has never been met, and with actual 
staff numbers usually somewhere in the high 200s, the mission is compromised in 
terms of both its ability to achieve goals, and its credibility in the eyes of Afghans and 
the international community. The EU’s small footprint and apparent inability to 
deploy staff in many areas around Afghanistan gives the US and its militarily oriented 
police reform strategy much greater credibility in the eyes of Afghan government 
officials.183 As a result, the role of the police in society has been framed in a way to 
be consistent with the US counterinsurgency strategy, with the ANP sometimes being 
drawn into military operations to support the ANA.184 This militarised role for the 
police, coupled with increasing force ceilings and exacerbated by high casualty rates, 
has led to the development of a situation where the quantity of police officers being 
trained is treated as a more urgent matter than their quality. 
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As a reflection of this prioritisation, salaries for military-style police forces such as 
the ABP and ANCOP tend to be much higher than those of the civilian AUP and CID. 
The starting pay for ANCOP is $260 per month, compared to the usual $165 per 
month for a recruit serving in a regular police unit.185 In addition, ANCOP requires its 
officers to have a basic level of literacy, and as a result, literate officers tend to be 
drawn away from civilian police forces where they could perform valuable duties 
such as collecting and processing criminal evidence, or bringing cases to trial. Even 
filling in simple forms required for day-to-day operations of the AUP and the CID 
require the basic abilities of reading and writing, but in a country with a police 
illiteracy rate of 90%,186 most of the literate officers fill the ranks of the militarily 
oriented ANCOP.187 Civilian policing has unquestionably suffered as a result. 
 
5.1.2 Financial Support 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, state-building depends on supporting the state’s capacities, 
reaching a durable political settlement, and imbuing the state with popular legitimacy. 
State-building is, importantly, more than simple capacity-building for the institutions 
of government. However, much of the EU’s focus in Afghanistan has been directed 
exclusively to the field of capacity-building. In fact, international involvement as a 
whole has even tended to undermine the other two facets of state-building by 
supplying military and financial resources through external channels instead of 
through the state. This has created many problems, in particular for the legitimacy of 
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the Afghan government, which derives 90% of its revenue from foreign aid.188 The 
primary issue is not the amount of aid being given, but rather its manner of delivery. 
Up to 80% of the money passes through what is known as the “external budget,” and 
bypasses the country’s core budget.189 This dual budgetary system means that most of 
the public spending in Afghanistan occurs outside the government’s fiscal control, 
diminishing the relevance and legitimacy of the state, and weakening the national 
budget as the primary tool for giving meaning to national policy. The European 
Commission’s economic and technical assistance to Afghanistan have had positive 
effects, making it possible to distribute large-scale relief and initiate an ambitious 
programme of reconstruction and modernisation within the police and the judiciary, 
but this has come at a cost. Unfortunately, the state’s ongoing dependence on external 
patronage undermines its legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people, and the 
externally driven reform process has not inspired enough feelings of local ownership 
within the population. 
 
5.1.3 Intrusiveness 
 
While it aims to fundamentally overhaul the structure of Afghanistan’s justice and 
police sectors, the EU’s footprint has tended to be much less intrusive than that of the 
US. EUPOL Afghanistan has been unable to deploy significant numbers of staff to 
many provinces, and the nature of relations between the police and Afghan society 
remains largely unchanged. The legitimacy of the central state is threatened when it 
cannot deliver public services, and the failure of the ANP to provide even basic 
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redress for injustices in many parts of the country has undermined the state-building 
process. In many places, the police are still viewed as part of the problem, and a 
source of insecurity, rather than as protectors.190 
 
5.1.4 Implications 
 
It appears that in spite of its ambitious aims to transform the nature of the police and 
judiciary, as well as the relationships those sectors have with each other and with the 
population at large, the EU’s real footprint in Afghanistan is a relatively small one. 
Certainly it is small when EUPOL Afghanistan is held up against the dominating US 
presence, and when Member State troop contributions are compared with those of the 
United States. The small footprint has limited the EU’s effectiveness at achieving 
mission objectives, and its credibility as a strategic coordinator. The character of 
Afghanistan’s police has been allowed to develop along the paramilitary dimension, 
while civilian policing, which has less immediate impacts on the insurgency, has 
languished as a result. 
 
However, the much larger US footprint is not without its drawbacks. The initial 
justification for state-building which was given in Washington was based on the 
assumption that a functioning democratic order would deny sanctuary to terrorists and 
actively help resolve the insurgency. Therefore, the US adopted an ambitious 
transformational agenda which envisaged revolutionising the terms of state-society 
relations in Afghanistan, in much the same way as the EU aims to revolutionise 
relations between society and the police and justice sectors. Yet even substantial 
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military pressure from the US has failed to achieve these political aims. As Astri 
Suhrke writes, it now seems that “the statebuilding venture can only be rescued if it is 
separated from the pursuit of the ‘war on terror,’ and if the insurgency is successfully 
dealt with.”191 Thanks to the culture of impunity surrounding well-known and widely 
reviled warlords, many Afghans have become disillusioned with the intervention and 
with their new government, and the kind of political settlement which was envisaged 
by the signatories to the Bonn Agreement of 2001 has not come about. Frequent 
casualties of Afghan civilians have exacerbated the problem, helping to alienate many 
local communities.192 The large US presence is also causing domestic support within 
the US itself to waver as casualties mount and public opposition to the continuing war 
in Afghanistan becomes stronger.193 Similarly, troop contributions from EU Member 
States have aroused some domestic opposition,194 and European politicians have 
applauded US decisions to reduce the scale of their military presence in 
Afghanistan.195 On the other hand, there have been few calls, if any, for the support to 
police and justice sector reform to be cut off. EUPOL Afghanistan reports that the 
mission is well liked by the Afghan people.196 
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5.2 The Duration Dilemma 
 
The duration dilemma is closely related to the footprint dilemma. Foreign military 
forces are more likely to wear out their welcome when they have a large and intrusive 
footprint, but also when they are deployed for too long.197 However, timescales for 
the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Afghanistan are vastly different from 
the timescales necessary for building a working justice sector infrastructure, and a 
police force capable of using it. A functioning security environment is a basic 
requirement for state-building, which has always been envisioned as a post-conflict 
activity, but there are serious doubts as to whether the Afghan security forces will be 
able to assume the burden of providing security on their own.198 Once international 
troops depart, the level of support which the insurgency will receive from other 
regional powers such as Iran and Pakistan also remains unknown. 
 
In Afghanistan, the EU’s footprint and duration dilemmas are both bound up with the 
contradiction between short-term and long-term imperatives. Given the ongoing 
problem of the Taliban-led insurgency, the need to establish a secure environment for 
trainers to train the ANP has meant that civilian policing and establishing the rule of 
law have become lower priorities than military-style policing. Officers are trained too 
quickly for a truly dangerous job, and most of their training revolves around survival 
skills.199 Quality control of the police will remain a crucial issue for managing a 
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successful transition. When the GPPO was able to administer three-year training 
modules it was possible to monitor the quality of recruits with some accuracy, but the 
shorter eight-week courses have sacrificed quality for quantity. Concerns have been 
voiced over the vetting procedures both at the start of training and at its conclusion.200 
Some 20% of graduates fail their drug tests,201 and the scale of Taliban infiltration of 
the ANP is impossible to estimate. Given the ease with which Afghans may obtain 
entry into an organisation desperate for numbers, it can be assumed that vetting 
procedures are not adequate to prevent infiltration of the police.202 Thankfully, the 
record of attacks by Taliban “sleepers” has been small so far, and given the lack of 
meaningful data about who prospective recruits really are – beyond a basic family or 
tribal level – vetting candidates remains a distant dream. Initiatives such as the US-led 
Personal Asset Inventory, which documents the holdings of police officers using 
biometric technology, will take time to provide a workable baseline. 
 
Without time for a host country’s political institutions to implement reforms and 
consolidate the rule of law, an intervention actually has the potential to do harm over 
the long run. Afghans worry in particular over the loyalty of informal police (arbakai) 
such as the LDI/CDI or the ALP towards the central state.203 If command and control 
mechanisms are not robust, these forces could easily feed a future generation of local 
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warlords in Afghanistan, or even provide former warlords with a convenient way of 
preserving their existing militias under a new name. It is therefore very important for 
the international community to withdraw in such a way that Kabul’s control over its 
own legal armed groups can remain intact. The EU’s exit strategy and transition of 
Afghanistan’s government towards full autonomy are tightly bound up with the 
duration dilemma. The question for the coming years will be whether the Afghan 
security forces are indeed ready to operate independently. It remains to be seen 
whether the absence of foreign military protection will compromise the ability of 
Afghan security forces to do their jobs. Several European countries including France, 
Germany, and Spain have announced decisions to scale back their troop deployments, 
but have promised that Afghan security forces will continue to receive support, 
training and equipment. 
 
The longer a large and visible foreign presence is deployed in a host country, the more 
resistance it tends to encounter, so in light of the US draw-down and the transition to 
Afghan control, it is wise for the EU to “play for time,” so to speak, by reducing its 
already small footprint and taking even more of an advisory role. EUPOL 
Afghanistan already operates with a far less visible footprint than the NTM-A, and the 
“Train the Trainers” programme of police mentoring will be a particularly important 
element in managing the transition process successfully. Although its scope and 
coverage will be limited, the mission is well situated to take advantage of a longer 
deployment than foreign military forces would be given. State-building must be a 
long-term process, but because of political considerations not altogether conditioned 
by the needs of state-building, large-scale withdrawal of foreign military forces is 
now a foregone conclusion. 
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5.3 Participation Dilemmas 
 
A key challenge for state-builders is to ensure that the institutions of an emerging 
state are perceived as legitimate by the local population. This is not something which 
can be externally directed, because conceptions of legitimacy are grounded in local 
experience. However, people do mistrust the state when they believe its leaders are 
unrepresentative, corrupt, criminal, or above the rule of law. Trust is particularly 
fragile in Afghanistan, where there has never been a strong central government, and 
where factionalism and ethnic conflict have historically led groups which control the 
state to use its coercive power against rivals, rather than on behalf of the public good. 
Realistically, the international community must often draw former combatants – 
especially potential spoilers – into the political settlement. The requirement from a 
state-building perspective is to engage other segments of society in post-conflict 
politics as well. The more the population can see the institutions of the state used by a 
wide range of different – even conflicting – interest groups, the more the state’s 
popular legitimacy grows. 
 
Promoting local ownership in the political process inevitably involves deciding who 
the “owners” should be, and it is here that the international community faces a 
participation dilemma. Paris and Sisk point to a distorting effect which state-building 
interventions can have, comparing the international presence to “a powerful magnet in 
an electric field.”204 By entering into a partnership with factional leaders, warlords, 
and other figures with ties to armed groups, crime, the illegal economy, and the 
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insurgency, the international community has damaged the credibility of the state. This 
problem derives from the simultaneous need for social justice and a clean break with 
the past. One of the participation dilemmas in Afghanistan revolved around the so-
called Northern Alliance, which made use of existing military structures to fight the 
Taliban in exchange for allowing militia commanders to become partners in the state-
building project. Given the primacy of military concerns to the US at the outset of its 
involvement in Afghanistan, the choice was made to incorporate these questionable 
local commanders into the new government, at the cost, most likely, of some of the 
long-term legitimacy of the state. 
 
Beyond the question of working with unrepresentative leaders, the EU has been 
forced to take a hand in the actual decision-making process for implementing reforms. 
This additional facet of the participation dilemma concerns the role played by the 
international community itself. The policy dilemma has its origins in another of the 
contradictions embedded in the idea of state-building: namely, that external control is 
required to stimulate local ownership. By diverting the attention of Afghan authorities 
towards externally defined objectives, such as the force strength targets for the police, 
the EU and other donors prevent local stakeholders from pursuing their aims in a 
more undirected way. Security is not the product of a mathematical formula, and it 
could well be that qualitative indicators of police competency would be more helpful 
for building institutional capacity in the Afghan context than the quantitative metrics 
advanced by donor governments. Such quantitative goals are helpful for the donors to 
show apparently concrete progress along a very visible dimension of police reform, 
but the increases to the tashkeel have proven to be both economically unsustainable 
and ineffective when it comes to providing the rule of law. 
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5.4 The Dependency Dilemma 
 
Related to the footprint and duration dilemmas is the problem of fostering dependency 
within the institutions of a host country. When the population is led to rely on large 
flows of assistance, managed externally and directed according to externally 
influenced strategic decisions, the state-building project risks working against its own 
long-term goal of developing a legitimate, self-reliant government. Dependency 
dilemmas are especially closely related to two contradictions embedded in the concept 
of state-building. Firstly, at the outset of an intervention, external control is often 
necessary to create the conditions for sustainable security and self-government. 
Secondly, spending can often be influenced by donor preconceptions of local needs, 
with supposedly universal values being promoted as a remedy for problems 
originating in a distinctly local context. The values of democratic governance, human 
rights, gender equality, and free-market economics tend to condition most long-term 
planning for state-building missions, but in Afghanistan there is a large segment of the 
population for whom such values are simply not representative or legitimate. 
Dismissing the opinions of such people may be required for the international 
community to pursue its vision of what an emerging state should resemble, but local 
sources are often those best qualified to identify needs and their appropriate remedies. 
There are risks associated with dismissing local preferences for how state-building 
should be carried out. 
 
As mentioned earlier, 90% of the revenue available to the Afghan government comes 
from foreign aid, and the majority of the running costs for Afghanistan’s security 
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forces are paid by external actors. Of this, up to 80% is being managed by donors 
themselves, creating costly inefficiencies and increasing the risk of fostering 
dependence within the Afghan government. In 2008, the US Government 
Accountability Office estimated that maintaining the security forces would require $2 
billion annually,205 and the US military has recommended tripling the size of the 
security forces in order to effectively combat the insurgency.206 This would entail 
support of $3 billion annually for the ANA, and $1 billion for the ANP.207 The 
Afghan government is clearly unable to meet the costs of maintaining its security 
forces without foreign assistance. However, state-building demands that Kabul have 
at its disposal the domestic sources of revenue that will enable it to extend and 
maintain its control over the countryside. 
 
The main concern is that foreign aid will eventually cease, and that the government of 
Afghanistan will be unable to cope with the shortfall. Foreign development aid 
typically drops by 30-40% during a recession, and experience with developing 
countries has shown that much of the aid money tends to be wasted.208 A report from 
the Afghan Ministry of Finance in 2008 released findings which show donors have 
fallen 48% short of financing even their own estimates of Afghanistan’s needs, and 
that much of the spending which has occurred has tended to be seriously out of line 
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with the priorities laid down in the ANDS.209 Megan Liaboe identifies four prominent 
economic options for reducing Afghanistan’s dependence on external powers, and 
perhaps even more importantly, on the opium trade and the illegal economy.210 These 
four options have been agreed upon by the Afghan government and the donor 
community, and comprise: a tax on major transport routes such as the “Ring Road,” 
circumscribing about 80% of the countryside; subsidies to the agricultural sector, in 
particular for fruit exports; mining of Afghan natural resources such as gold, uranium, 
iron, and marble; and a pipeline to transport Turkmenistan’s natural gas through 
Afghanistan. The mining sector is particularly promising, and holds the potential for 
large-scale job creation. A copper mine in Aynak has the potential to fill 25% of the 
government’s financial gap if full production is reached.211 There are problems with 
each of these options, and none of them would altogether solve Afghanistan’s 
financial woes, but they indicate that the country has the potential for significant 
economic development. 
 
5.5 Coherence Dilemmas 
 
The normative coherence dilemmas which face the international donor community in 
Afghanistan stem from the contradiction between universal values and local needs. 
An organisational coherence dilemma also arises, influenced primarily by the clash 
between short- and long-term objectives. Achieving normative coherence in a state-
building intervention means reconciling different strategic visions within the donor 
community, as well as achieving a consensus with the host country on how to 
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proceed. Organisational coherence refers to the coordination between international 
actors to avoid duplication of labour and working at cross-purposes. It also refers to 
coordination among local actors, which is needed to produce nationally representative 
figures who can productively negotiate with the donor community. 
 
5.5.1 Normative Coherence 
 
Within the context of international support to the SSR process, the most important 
step for achieving normative coherence involves reconciling the civilian and military 
roles which the police are expected to fulfil. Core competencies of survival training, 
marching in a straight line, arresting suspects, and firing weapons are not sufficient to 
allow police to provide real human security in Afghan communities. Unfortunately, 
until there is consensus between international donors and the government of 
Afghanistan on how the police should be used, they cannot be trained with coherent 
goals in mind. The poor quality of civilian policing reflects rushed training and 
formation periods designed to cater to the military needs of state security. 
 
In dealing with the Afghan authorities, international actors should also be aware of 
different conceptions of legitimacy. As outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis, legitimacy 
derives from several potentially competing sources. Within Afghanistan, most power 
elites draw their legitimacy from a combination of custom, clientelism, performance-
based legitimacy, and ideologically-based legitimacy rooted in Islamic faith or ethnic 
solidarity. Maintaining informal networks and relationships will often be much more 
important to Afghans than any regulation or law. However, the broadly liberal norms 
underpinning state-building interventions tend to lead international donors to favour 
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process-based legitimacy, and while there is value in working towards a transparent, 
accountable, depersonalised, and democratic political process, pragmatism forces 
externally assisted state-building to work with figures whose legitimacy is derived 
from other sources. Speaking to supporters after his own presidential campaign had 
failed, Ashraf Ghani urged all Afghan citizens to be patient in their pursuit of justice 
and the rule of law, saying that “Our national duty lies in ensuring that we are going 
to end up with a legitimate outcome from a flawed process.”212 The international 
community may have no choice but to follow the same counsel. Assuming 
prematurely that Afghanistan is characterised by respect for human rights and the rule 
of law would be harmful self-delusion. 
 
5.5.2 Organisational Coherence 
 
Reform of the police and justice sectors in Afghanistan will require an integrated 
strategy. Although coordination has evolved from simple divisions of labour into 
more effective information-sharing, a unified strategy is still not evident. It must be 
decided whether the police should operate as a paramilitary organisation available for 
use combating the Taliban insurgency, or as a civilian force designed to promote and 
protect the rule of law. This will determine decisions on how to recruit, train, equip, 
and deploy the police, and will ultimately have profound implications for the Afghan 
security sector and the state-building process as a whole. 
 
Germany’s initial involvement as the “lead donor” to police reform created some 
confusion, as it was unclear how the role of a lead donor should be interpreted. The 
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United States undertook the complete construction from scratch of the ANA, while 
Germany defined a more limited role for itself in directly implementing and financing 
police reform activities. The GPPO did, however, take its responsibilities to 
coordinate international aid very seriously. Germany’s quick deployment of police 
trainers and its vocal support for the GPPO’s coordination role led other international 
actors to believe the police sector was under control,213 but when it became evident 
that the scale of the contribution Germany could make would be limited, the US 
became more involved through the Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A). With the dramatic increases in US support, now channelled 
through the NTM-A, there have been obvious difficulties for a lead donor attempting 
to “coordinate” another donor which contributes 50 to 100 times the resources 
personnel. Coordination at first consisted of a division of labour, with the US 
providing basic training on a large scale while Germany supplied advanced training, 
but the lack of actual coordination quickly produced a duplication of efforts, as when 
Germany and the US launched parallel programmes to reform the Ministry of the 
Interior in 2004.214 Two police coordination conferences in Dubai, in April and 
October of 2006, allowed most of the countries with police advisors in Afghanistan to 
agree on the importance of a shared strategy. The IPCB was created as a result of 
these conferences, along with the Interagency Police Coordinated Action Group 
(IPCAG) which took on the political and diplomatic aspects of coordination. LOTFA 
donors, the EUSR, the EC, and UNAMA are all represented on this body. 
 
                                                 
213 A. Wilder. “Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police.” Kabul: AREU, 
2007. 
214 M. Sedra. “National Police and Law Enforcement.” (Technical Annex) Securing Afghanistan’s 
Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward. Kabul: Transitional Islamic State of 
Afghanistan, 2004. 
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In spite of the progress which has been made so far, several coordination challenges 
remain. Some of these result from the different policing and legal traditions of 
different contributors, including differences between civil and common law 
jurisdictions. Others are more fundamental and stem from the lack of a coherent 
vision for the police. The EU has aimed to fill this gap by launching the EC Rule of 
Law Mission and by subsuming national contributions to police reform within 
EUPOL Afghanistan. Much work remains to be done on improving links between the 
justice and police sectors, though, and the EU’s ability to promote its strategic vision 
will depend on both the resources committed and the political weight of its Afghan 
missions in the eyes of Member States and other international actors.  
 
5.6 Policy Recommendations 
 
The EU’s involvement in Afghanistan is heavily bound up with the SSR process. A 
great deal of progress has already been made, and the Afghanistan of 2011 is 
unrecognisable when compared to the Afghanistan of 2001. The following 
recommendations are not intended to devalue past achievements in reforming the 
Afghan security sector, but it is hoped that an analysis of the contradictions and 
dilemmas facing the donor community can contribute to more effective engagement 
in the future. 
 
Devote resources for justice sector reform more equitably 
Justice sector reform is essential to police sector reform and the entire SSR process. 
The Attorney General’s Office and the Department of Prisons are not being properly 
financed, and contributions to the justice sector should include resources for all of the 
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key organisations. Links can be developed between these institutions by sector-wide 
training programmes. 
 
Develop institutional depth within the justice sector 
A “criminal justice surge” is needed to address decades of neglect, especially at the 
district and provincial levels where most Afghans experience the justice dispensed by 
the state. Reform should focus on providing better geographical coverage and more 
standardised legal training for judges. 
 
Formalise relationships between the state and non-state providers of justice 
Informal provision of justice and customary dispute resolution mechanisms do not 
have to be inimical to the central state. A formal division of labour should be drawn 
up to create a hybrid justice sector, allowing more serious disputes to be decided by 
the state-run court system while allowing minor disputes to be managed through local 
communities. Non-state providers of justice must be carefully monitored to leave 
records of their decisions and ensure they operate within the principles of 
international law and the Constitution of Afghanistan. Realistically, informal 
mechanisms will continue to exist, and should be integrated into the state-building 
process, rather than ignored. 
 
Create a civilian police force, not a military one 
The priority for the ANP should be the provision of human security, instead of the 
security of the state. Afghanistan is still a conflict environment, and the police are still 
a target of insurgents, but the ANP should be a force for law enforcement, not a 
military auxiliary. Placing police officers in unnecessary danger has resulted in 
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extremely high casualties and contributed to an unacceptable attrition. Policing with 
the consent of communities also requires a rhetorical, conceptual, and operational 
separation of the police and the army. 
 
Avoid empowering informal militias 
The APPP should be reviewed with the greatest of care, and perhaps disestablished 
altogether. Given Afghanistan’s history with informal non-state armed groups, the 
decision to allow local militias to operate with the state’s blessing sends a powerful 
message that the government is not committed to the DDR process. Local warlords 
should be prevented from shielding their militias behind informal police forces. 
 
Focus on qualitative measures of ANP competency before increasing the tashkeel 
Increases in the force strength of the police units have not stopped the security 
situation in Afghanistan from deteriorating, and the police are still incapable of 
providing basic law enforcement in many areas of the country. Addressing this will 
require implementing more rigorous vetting procedures, longer training periods, and a 
qualitatively different style of training. There should be an emphasis on basic literacy 
and familiarity with human rights and the Afghan Constitution, and officers should be 
acquainted with the entire investigative and judicial process before being assigned to 
active duty. 
 
Establish an independent police complaints authority 
The police cannot police themselves, and an independent authority must be 
established with real disciplinary powers to investigate complaints against the police. 
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This authority could work with NGOs and the Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission to establish relationships within communities. 
 
Procure more staff for EUPOL Afghanistan 
The inability of EUPOL Afghanistan to meet its already inadequate personnel targets 
has seriously undermined the mission’s credibility and its chances for success. 
National governments within the EU should renew their efforts to procure qualified 
experts and officers for the posts which have not been filled. This is indispensable if 
EUPOL Afghanistan is to fulfil the coordination role intended for it, and if the EC 
Rule of Law Mission is to succeed, police reform will need to advance in tandem. 
 
Develop an Afghan vision of the police and justice sectors 
Articulating a coherent Afghan vision of the police and justice sectors is at least as 
important as reconciling the civilian and military conceptions of the role of the police. 
Some senior political figures with ties to armed groups or the illegal economy benefit 
from the status quo, and would prefer the ANP to remain factionalised. Addressing 
the culture of impunity at the highest levels of the Afghan government will mean 
securing the loyalty of the police towards the central state. One way of doing this may 
involve a revival of the pre-1992 practice of compulsory universal military or police 
service, and this idea should be publicly debated. 
 
Make aid money conditional upon reform of the Ministry of the Interior 
Tackling corruption at the highest levels remains a key challenge for Afghanistan and 
the international community. Removing the need for presidential decrees to fire 
officers in the Ministry of the Interior would help send a signal that a culture of 
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impunity will not be tolerated, and making receipt of foreign assistance conditional 
upon meeting certain benchmarks in the reform of the Ministry’s anti-corruption 
procedures will provide powerful financial incentives. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
It is disturbing that many of the challenges facing the state-building project in 
Afghanistan have been identified before, and have been well known for many years. 
There is no question that the EU and the international donor community continue to 
make commitments to the goals of state-building, and these goals are acknowledged 
as long-term processes. However, the process of dilemma analysis forces 
contradictions embedded in the idea of state-building to be recognised, and their 
implications explicitly unpacked. Often, as in the case of Afghanistan, these 
contradictions result in concrete policy dilemmas. The international community’s 
experience in Afghanistan has highlighted all five of the major policy dilemmas 
which face modern state-building missions, and it is hoped that future research will 
uncover more cases which showcase the same set of dilemmas. Interventions must 
always take account of the local context, but to draw transferable lessons from one 
case to another, a set of consistent questions needs to be developed. By confronting 
the inconsistencies within international approaches to state-building, dilemma 
analysis offers a helpful framework for asking these questions. The value of this 
analytical tool is in identifying where different strategic visions diverge, and what 
policy options are likely to exacerbate or balance the challenges which emerge. In the 
case of Afghanistan, it is not too late to adopt policies which will enhance the 
prospects for a durable state and a better quality of life for the population. 
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